

DCAS testing campaign

Proving ground tests

*A. Kriston, K. Mattas, D. Maggi, B. Ciuffo, R. Dona, E. Rusciano,
F. Re, F. Minarini, G. Morandin, D. Broggi, S. Vass, D. Miotello*
European Commission Joint Research Centre

TF ADAS 30
13 May 2024

Topics

- Challenges / Question
- Current testing activity
 - Proving ground – Critical scenarios
 - Public road
 - Driver monitoring systems
- Discussion
 - What is a SIM?
 - How to take into human factors

Challenge

DCAS Safety?

- Reduction of work load
- Driver support
- Less aggressive driving
- Avoid critical situation
- Stress?



- Reduction of attentiveness
- System failure(s), sudden disengagement
- Mode confusion
- Overtrust
- Who drives?
- Stress?

Safety gap/issues

“L2 systems cannot become L3 systems by just further extending the ODD and performance” – Schuster (BMW), 2022 SafetyWeek

“The driver needs to be aware of the allocation of driving task **all times!**” – Raisch (BMW), 2022 SafetyWeek

“Unexpected system behavior takes time for a driver to react to” - IIHS

System should be robust “enough” that it does not bring the vehicle to safety critical situation

“Added functionality can exacerbate driver misunderstanding about system limitations” - IIHS


“Risky situations can develop if the vehicle starts to move or performs a complex maneuver before the driver is ready” - IIHS

Are they the right questions?

If not, is there enough time for the driver to put the hands back on the steering wheel and to act?

How long will it take to put back the hands on the steering wheel when sudden, unexpected events happen like

How will the driver cope with a power steering failure during H-free operation? When taking back manual control the driver is expecting power steering support and absence can lead to dangerous situations;



Tested vehicles

Deep analysis:

- Tesla Model 3 (v.11) with FSD
- Ford March-e with lane centering and lane change during eyes-on warning (hands-off) only
- Cupra – R79 (previous testing campaign)


Screening analysis

- Tesla Model 3 (new FSD, v12)
- GM with SuperCruise


- **No vehicle was developed for DCAS!**

Behavior of an R79 vehicle

- Test site: UTAC, France
- Cupra R79 type approved vehicle
- Real motorbike and car target
- GVT for critical scenarios (AEB)
- Tests:
 - AEB – with different speed and overlap
 - B1 in curves and S-band
 - ACSF-C
 - Urban (e.g. round about



Reaction time at system disengagement



Critical for hands-off
Warning is too late
Strong steering intervention – lateral acceleration



Control of longitudinal speed already in DCAS



Who needs to react?



Need to take into account the general behavior of the AEB
Robustness - "System should not change strategy" - already in DCAS

ACC (with AEB) in straight and curved roads

Impact vs. Test typeACC / Driver



- No reaction above 70 km/h!

What happens during a maneuver



Traffic situation changes

System reaches its boundary

Suspension? – Go on? – Go back?


Proving ground test preliminary results





- Tesla Model 3 (v.11) with FSD
- Ford March-e with lane centering and lane change during eyes-on warning (hands-off) only

Testing critical scenarios

Test	DCAS paragraph in ANNEX 4	Conditions	Comments
Positioning in the lane of travel	4.2.5.1.1.	vary the speed, lane curvature (S-band), lane marking, road edge also	Hands-off could not be initiated
Driver-initiated lane changes	4.2.5.1.2.	Vary the ego speed, approaching vehicle and their position in the lane	Cannot be initiated for some vehicles
System-initiated lane changes	4.2.5.1.4.	Vary the ego speed, approaching vehicle and their position in the lane, curves included	Cannot be initiated for some vehicles
Stationary vehicle ahead on a straight section of road	4.2.5.2.1.	vary the speed, the target and the overlap, daylight and night	Both in manual and ADAS driving
Stationary vehicle ahead on a curved section of road	4.2.5.2.2.	vary the speed, the target and the overlap	Both in manual and ADAS driving
Cut-out of lead vehicle	4.2.5.2.5.	vary the speeds and the headway distance	M1 target, different speeds and headway distance
Cut-in of vehicle from adjacent lane	4.2.5.2.6.	Vary cut-in vehicle type	M1 and motor targets
Stationary pedestrian ahead in lane	4.2.5.2.8.		
Stationary bicycle target ahead in lane	4.2.5.2.9.	With different overlap	
Pedestrian target crossing into the path of the VUT	4.2.5.2.10.	With different overlap, daylight and night	Both in manual and ADAS driving
Bicycle crossing into the path of the VUT	4.2.5.2.11.	With different overlap	
Pedestrian target crossing into the path of the VUT in an intersection	4.2.5.2.12.	With different overlap,	
Bicycle target crossing into the path of the VUT in an intersection	4.2.5.2.13.	With different overlap	
VUT turns across a path of an oncoming vehicle	4.2.5.2.14.	With different overlap	
VUT crosses the straight path of the vehicle target in an intersection	4.2.5.2.15.	With different overlap	Stop signs may alter the test outcome
Complex traffic situation		Oncoming, blocked road, braking, platooning and string stability	Different targets, configurations, overlap

Test location





Winding Straight Length = 2292 Ft / 698.60 M

Segment 1 – Sta 223+75 to 231+67 = 792 Ft / 241.4 M

Grade = -0.89%

Segment 2 – Sta 0+00 to 6+00 = 600 Ft / 182.88 M

Grade = -0.89%

Segment 3 – Sta 6+00 to 8+03 = 203 Ft / 61.87 M

Grade = -1.46%

Segment 4 – Sta 8+03 to 8+50 = 47 Ft / 14.33 M

Grade = -1.45%

Segment 5 – Sta 8+50 to 15+00 = 650 Ft / 198.12 M

Grade = -0.76%






Preliminary results

- Stationary vehicle ahead on a straight section of road (4.2.5.2.1.)

Driving modes:


- Manual driving = Driver controls both lateral and longitudinal direction with active safety (e.g. AEB) activated
- ADAS: highest level of L2 system is activated
- ACC: Driver lateral and system (ACC) longitudinal control

General test result – SILC (Vehicle 1)




- Probability of impact was significantly lower with assisted driving
- SILC kept longer longitudinal distance and lower lateral acceleration

Assessment of warning times






Optical warning/indication time distribution




- Can the driver confirm the maneuvers? What to do if not or too late?
- What happens after the confirmation?

General test results - no SILC (Vehicle 2)




- Probability of impact is higher at smaller offset especially for manual driving
- During avoidance higher lateral acceleration is needed to avoid in the last minute

Assessment of warning times



— Acoustic Not found — Optical Not found — Mild_dec 24.73 s — AEB Not found — Impact No impact
 TTC 4.12 s

Optical warning/indication time distribution









- The time of moving the hands back needs to be taken into account
- No warning or indication was shown when the system avoided the impact

Preliminary results

- Stationary vehicle ahead on a **curved** section of road (4.2.5.2.2.)



With SILC




— Acoustic	— Optical	— Mild_dec	— AEB	— Impact
Not found	14.71 s	14.63 s	15.03 s	19.43 s
	TTC 2.75 s	TTC 2.83 s	TTC 2.50 s	Lat. Dist. -1.82 m
	AEB 0.32 s	AEB 0.40 s	Speed red. 2.72 km/h	Speed red. 35.41 km/h

General description (Vehicle 1)

Optical warning/indication time distribution









ADAS



Manual


- Depending on the scenario the time gap for reaction can decrease

Without SILC





— Acoustic	— Optical	— Mild_dec	— AEB	— Impact
33.28 s	33.29 s	33.08 s	33.49 s	No impact
TTC 1.47 s	TTC 1.46 s	TTC 1.65 s	TTC 1.32 s	
AEB 0.22 s	AEB 0.20 s	AEB 0.41 s	Speed red. 3.40 km/h	

General results (Vehicle 2)




Optical warning/indication time distribution









ADAS

Manual

- Small overlap is a main cause of impacts



Oncoming traffic



— Acoustic
Not found



— Optical
15.78 s
TTC 5.05 s

— Mild_dec
17.19 s
TTC 3.65 s

— AEB
Not found


— Impact
21.12 s
Lat. Dist. 1.78 m
Speed red. 1.55 km/h

Preliminary results Cut-in (4.2.5.2.6)




- Anticipation is a key to avoid impact!
- Very little time or no time may be available to move the hands back and react


Warning times during cut in



Positive: anticipatory
Negative: late warning



Lead vehicle brakes at 6m/s^2



- No chance for the driver to avoid the accident
- Further measures are needed regarding controllability
- Mandatory test for EOW in the whole range of the operating speed (i.e. upto 130 km/h)

Acoustic	Optical	Mild_dec	AEB	Impact
14.23 s	13.98 s	13.79 s	14.28 s	14.99 s
TTC 0.91 s	TTC 1.36 s	TTC 1.82 s	TTC 0.83 s	Lat. Dist. -2.66 m
AEB 0.05 s	AEB 0.30 s	AEB 0.49 s	Speed red. 3.29 km/h	Speed red. 13.03 km/h

Discussion

- Higher level assistance given to the driver resulted in lower level of risk of impact on proving ground tests
 - The tested L2 vehicles have better safety performance than an L1 vehicle (R79/L1)
 - More capable systems may avoid critical situation rather than to wait for the last moment of intervention – limitation of active safety systems?
 - **No evidence is found to limit the level of assistance to the driver**
- Does the driver have enough time to react?
 - Earlier indication of maneuvers was observed for SLIC but the available times depends on the traffic situation. Time is not always enough time for decision and confirmation
 - In some scenarios (cut-in, braking) there is no or very little time exists for the driver to react (especially in EOW driving) -> system needs to have the capability to mitigate or avoid impact.

Thank you



© European Union 2023

Unless otherwise noted the reuse of this presentation is authorised under the [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) license. For any use or reproduction of elements that are not owned by the EU, permission may need to be sought directly from the respective right holders.