## OICA position for AECS-10

### AECS sled test scope

- **The sled with AECD components shall be decelerated or, at the choice of the applicant, accelerated such that the curve remains within the area of the graph in Annex 7, and the total velocity change $\Delta V$ is 70 +0/-2km/h.**

### Testing agency can select some malfunction for verification

- **Connection failure to crash control unit:**
  - GNSS receiver
  - eCall control unit

This shall at least monitor:

- AECS function
- AECS trigger
- R94/R95 post crash verifications (door opening, pictures, fuel leakage, unfastening seat belt, removing the dummy, ...)

### Power supply after crash

- **OICA position for AECS-10**

### Malfunction warning

- **The length of the harness and its eventual fixation can be decided by the OEM / Supplier so that it is representative:**

  - OICA can not accept a high decelleration test on a main AECD power supply. These can be verified sufficiently through the regular R94/R95 test.

### AECD test pulse

- **Only connectors related to parts in the scope of this sled test (listed in par. 7.6.1)**

- We can understand the PSAP requesting to resend the MSD but we don't understand the use case of a PSAP requesting new position data after an accident.

- We do not accept a mandatory post crash assessment of the manual triggering system because in any case OEM's in the post crash condition of this regulation has to guarantee an automatic trigger. There is no use case for a manual trigger.

### AECD back-up

- **AECS functionality**
  - Power source
  - Emergency call
  - GPS positioning

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### AECS back-up

- **Critical ITU-P requirements will be taken out or relaxed (OICA is now investigating the final ITU-P standard and will propose the relaxation item by next AECS-11).**

- Russia can commit it will adopt ECE AECS to replace the ERA Glonass HF Voice communication requirements.

- In our view AECS is not a primary safety system and therefore the malfunction requirements should not be restrictive and can be left up to the Manufacturer's policy.

### Power supply after crash

- **We don't want overload the post-crash assessment with unnecessary requirements**
  - OEM can use a manual trigger as back-up if the MNO fails or if the post crash AECS verification is done in 2 stages (automatic trigger check, move vehicle to shielded room, than manual trigger)

### Pre-crash manual trigger check

- **We do not want a mandatory post crash assessment of the manual triggering system because in any case OEM's in the post crash condition of this regulation has to guarantee an automatic trigger. There is no use case for a manual trigger.**

- **OICA believes that it is too simple to mandate this requirement in its current form.**

- **OICA believes that the current proposal is too restrictive and creates unnecessary costs.**

- **OICA is of the opinion that this requirement will compromise future designs of emergency call systems where the positioning function is combined with the on board navigation system. On board navigation systems including screen are not allowed to be used in post crash conditions.**

### Voice communication

- **We do not accept a mandatory post crash assessment of the manual triggering system because in any case OEM's in the post crash condition of this regulation has to guarantee an automatic trigger. There is no use case for a manual trigger.**

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### Failure verification

- **OICA is of the opinion that this requirement will compromise future designs of emergency call systems where the positioning function is combined with the on board navigation system. On board navigation systems including screen are not allowed to be used in post crash conditions.**

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