

Proposal for a new UN Regulation on

Uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with regard to Automated Lane Keeping Systems

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* Page number will be updated at a later stage

Introduction

Draft proposal made by the secretariat:

The intention of the Regulation is to establish uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with regard to Automated Lane Keeping Systems (ALKS).

ALKS, installed in passenger cars (M₁ vehicles), influence the lateral movement of the vehicle and controls the longitudinal movement of the vehicle for extended periods without further driver command.

This UN Regulation is the first regulatory step for the introduction of Level 3 automated driving system (as defined in ECE/TRANS/WP.29/1140) in traffic and it therefore provides innovative provisions aimed at addressing the complexity related to the evaluation of the system safety. It contains administrative provisions suitable for type approval, technical requirements, audit and reporting provisions, testing provisions as well as a new assessment test method e.g. in Annex 4, Appendix 1.

ALKS can be activated under certain conditions on roads where pedestrians and cyclists are prohibited and which, by design, are equipped with a physical separation that divides the traffic moving in opposite directions and prevent traffic from cutting across the path of the vehicle. In a first step, the original text of this UN Regulation limits the operational speed to 60 km/h maximum, in agreement with the broad automotive industry from all regions of the world, consulted and involved in this work.

This UN Regulation includes general requirements regarding the system safety and the failsafe response. It also includes requirements concerning the dynamic driving task. It contains requirements concerning the *transition demand*: the system shall detect its limits and always issue a transition demand with a sufficient lead time. This phase is terminated when the system is deactivated or a minimum risk manoeuvre has started. A minimum risk manoeuvre shall be started automatically, earliest 10 s after the start of the transition demand. In case of severe ALKS failure or severe vehicle failure, a MRM may be initiated immediately. This Regulation contains provisions on Driver Availability Recognition System to check the driver's presence and the driver availability. The Regulation defined also, among other, the conditions for overriding the system.

This UN Regulation anticipates the case where the Contracting Parties would allow that drivers in vehicles equipped with ALKS to perform other activities other than those related to driving as discussed by the Global Forum for Road Traffic Safety (WP.1) at the time of drafted (See e.g. Informal Document 4 Revision 1 of the 78th session of WP.1). This anticipation results in the provisions in paragraph 6.1.4. requesting to switch off systems delivering activities other than driving in relevant phases for the sake of safety. This anticipation is not an implicit authorization provided to manufacturers to offer activities other than driving to drivers; nor it is an implicit encouragement to drivers of ALKS equipped vehicles to perform other activities than driving.

1. Scope and purpose

- 1.1. This Regulation applies to vehicles of Category M₁.

2. Definitions

For the purposes of this Regulation:

- 2.1. “Automated Lane Keeping System (ALKS)” for low speed application is a system which is activated by the driver and which keeps the vehicle within its lane at the speed of 60 km/h or below by influencing the lateral movement of the vehicle and controls the longitudinal movement of the vehicle for extended periods without further driver command.
- Within this Regulation, ALKS is also referred to as “*the system*”.
- 2.1.1. “Vehicle Type with regard to Automated Lane Keeping System (ALKS)” means a category of vehicles which do not differ in such essential aspects as:
- (a) Vehicle features which significantly influence the performances of ALKS;
 - (b) The system characteristics and design of ALKS.
- 2.2. “Transition demand” is a logical and intuitive procedure to transfer the Dynamic Driving Task (DDT) from automated control by the system to human driver control. This request given from the system to the human driver indicates the transition phase.
- 2.3. “Transition phase” means the duration of the transition demand.
- 2.4. “Planned event” is a situation which is known in advance, e.g. at the time of activation such as a journey point (e.g. exit of a highway) etc. and which requires a transition demand.
- 2.5. “Unplanned event” is a situation which is unknown in advance, but assumed as very likely in happening, e.g. road construction, inclement weather, approaching emergency vehicle, missing lane marking, load falling from truck (collision) and which requires a transition demand.
- 2.6. “Imminent collision risk” describes a situation or an event which leads to a collision of the vehicle with another road user or an obstacle which cannot be avoided by a braking demand with lower than 5 m/s².
- 2.7. “Minimum Risk Manoeuvre (MRM)” means a procedure aimed at minimising risks in traffic, which is automatically performed by the system after a transition demand.
- 2.8. “Emergency Manoeuvre (EM)” is a manoeuvre performed by the system in case of an event in which the vehicle is at imminent collision risk with the purpose of avoiding or mitigating a collision.
- 2.9. Speed
- 2.9.1. “Specified maximum speed” is the speed declared by the manufacturer up to which the system operates under optimum conditions.
- 2.9.2. “Maximum operational speed” is the speed selected by the system up to which the system operates under current environmental and sensor conditions. It is the maximum vehicle speed at which the system may be active and shall be determined by the capability of the sensing system as well as the environmental conditions.
- 2.9.3. “Present speed” or “speed” is the current speed selected by the system due to traffic.
- 2.10. “Detection range” of the sensing system is the distance at which the system can reliably recognise a target, taking account of the deterioration of

components of the sensing system due to time and usage throughout the lifetime of the vehicle and generate a control signal.

- 2.11. Failures
- 2.11.1. An “*ALKS failure*” is any single failure specific to the operation of the ALKS (e.g. single sensor failure, loss of necessary calculation data for the driving path of the vehicle).
- 2.11.2. “*Failure mode*” is the operation status of the system in which the system operates with an ALKS failure.
- 2.11.3. A “*severe ALKS failure*” is a failure specific to the operation of the ALKS that affects the safe operation of the system when in failure mode with a very low probability of occurrence such as generally used for essential components as e.g. an electronic control unit. Single sensor failures are only considered as such when accompanied by another influence affecting the safe operation of the system.
- 2.11.4. A “*severe vehicle failure*” is any failure of the vehicle (e.g. electrical, mechanical) that affects the ability of the ALKS to perform the DDT and would also affect the manual operation of the vehicle (e.g. loss of power supply, failure of the braking system, sudden loss of tire pressure).
- 2.12. “*Self-check*” means an integrated function which checks for any system failure and for the detection range of the sensing system on a continuous basis.
- 2.13. A “*system override*” by the driver means a situation when the driver provides an input to a control which has priority over the longitudinal or lateral control of the system, while the system is still active.
- 2.14. “*Dynamic Driving Task (DDT)*” is the control and execution of all longitudinal and lateral movements of the vehicle.
- 2.15. “*Data Storage System for Automated Driving (DSSAD)*” enables the determination of interactions between the ALKS and the human driver.¹
- 2.16. “*Lifetime of the system*” is the period of time during which the ALKS system is available, as a function, on the vehicle.

From EDR/DSSAD

- [2.17. “*Occurrences*” means, in the context of DSSAD provisions in para. 8, an action, fact or instance of occurring, something that happens, event or incident.]

RxSWIN

- 2.18. “*Rx Software Identification Number (RXSWIN)*” means a dedicated identifier, defined by the vehicle manufacturer, representing information about the type approval relevant software of the Electronic Control System contributing to the UN Regulation No. x type approval relevant characteristics of the vehicle.
- 2.19. “*Electronic Control System*” means a combination of units, designed to cooperate in the production of the stated vehicle control function by electronic data processing. Such systems, often controlled by software, are built from discrete functional components such as sensors, electronic control units and actuators and connected by transmission links. They may include mechanical, electro-pneumatic or electro-hydraulic elements. “The System”, referred to herein, is the one for which type approval is being sought.
- 2.20. “*Software*” means the part of an Electronic Control System that consists of digital data and instructions.

¹ To be revised in accordance with IWG on EDR/DSSAD.

3. Application for approval

- 3.1. The application for approval of a vehicle type with regard to the ALKS shall be submitted by the vehicle manufacturer or by his authorized representative.
- 3.2. It shall be accompanied by the documents mentioned below in triplicate:
 - 3.2.1. A description of the vehicle type with regard to the items mentioned in paragraph 2.1.1., together with a documentation package which gives access to the basic design of the ALKS and the means by which it is linked to other vehicle systems or by which it directly controls output variables. The numbers and/or symbols identifying the vehicle type shall be specified.
- 3.3. A vehicle representative of the vehicle type to be approved shall be submitted to the Technical Service conducting the approval tests.

4. Approval

- 4.1. If the vehicle type submitted for approval pursuant to this Regulation meets the requirements of paragraph 5 to 9 below, approval of that vehicle shall be granted.
- 4.2. An approval number shall be assigned to each type approved; its first two digits (at present 00 corresponding to the 00 series of amendments) shall indicate the series of amendments incorporating the most recent major technical amendments made to the Regulation at the time of issue of the approval. The same Contracting Party shall not assign the same number to another vehicle type.
- 4.3. Notice of approval or of refusal or withdrawal of approval pursuant to this Regulation shall be communicated to the Parties to the Agreement which apply this Regulation by means of a form conforming to the model in Annex 1 and documentation supplied by the applicant being in a format not exceeding A4 (210 x 297 mm), or folded to that format, and on an appropriate scale or electronic format.
- 4.4. There shall be affixed, conspicuously and in a readily accessible place specified on the approval form, to every vehicle conforming to a vehicle type approved under this Regulation, an international approval mark conforming to the model described in Annex 2, consisting of:
 - 4.4.1. A circle surrounding the letter "E" followed by the distinguishing number of the country which has granted approval;²
 - 4.4.2. The number of this Regulation, followed by the letter "R", a dash and the approval number to the right of the circle prescribed in paragraph 4.4.1. above.
- 4.5. If the vehicle conforms to a vehicle type approved under one or more other Regulations, annexed to the Agreement, in the country which has granted approval under this Regulation, the symbol prescribed in paragraph 4.4.1. above need not be repeated; in such a case, the Regulation and approval numbers and the additional symbols shall be placed in vertical columns to the right of the symbol prescribed in paragraph 4.4.1. above.
- 4.6. The approval mark shall be clearly legible and be indelible.
- 4.7. The approval mark shall be placed close to or on the vehicle data plate.

² The distinguishing numbers of the Contracting Parties to the 1958 Agreement are reproduced in Annex 3 to the Consolidated Resolution on the Construction of Vehicles (R.E.3), document ECE/TRANS/WP.29/78/Rev. 6 - www.unece.org/trans/main/wp29/wp29wgs/wp29gen/wp29resolutions.html

5. System Safety and Fail-safe Response

- 5.1. General Requirements
- 5.1.1. The activated system shall perform the DDT, manage all situations including failures, and shall not endanger the safety of the vehicle occupants or any other road users.
- The activated system shall not cause any collisions that are reasonably foreseeable and preventable. If a collision can be safely avoided without causing another one, it shall be avoided. When the vehicle is involved in a detectable collision, the vehicle shall be brought to a standstill.
- 5.1.2. The activated system shall comply with traffic rules relating to the DDT in the country of operation.
- 5.1.3. The activated system shall exercise control over systems required to support the driver in resuming manual control at any time (e.g. demist, windscreen wipers and lights).
- 5.1.4. A transition demand shall not endanger the safety of the vehicle occupants or other road users.
- 5.1.5. If the driver fails to resume control of the DDT during the transition phase, the system shall perform a minimum risk manoeuvre. During a minimum risk manoeuvre, the system shall minimise risks to safety of the vehicle occupants and other road users.
- 5.1.6. The system shall perform self-checks to detect the occurrence of failures and to confirm system performance at all times (e.g. after vehicle start the system has at least once detected an object at the same or a higher distance than that declared as detection range according to paragraph 7.1.).
- 5.1.7. The effectiveness of the system shall not be adversely affected by magnetic or electrical fields. This shall be demonstrated by compliance with the 05 or later series of amendments to UN Regulation No. 10.
- 5.1.8. The manufacturer shall take measures to guard against reasonably foreseeable misuse by the driver and tampering of the system.
- 5.1.9. When the system can no longer meet the requirements of this Regulation, it shall not be possible to activate the system.
- The manufacturer shall declare and implement a process to manage the safety and continued compliance of the ALKS system over lifetime. The process and any measures implemented shall be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Technical Service as part of the Annex 4 assessment.
- 5.2. Dynamic Driving Task
- 5.2.1. The activated system shall keep the vehicle inside its lane of travel and ensure that the vehicle does not cross any lane marking (outer edge of the front tyre to outer edge of the lane marking). The system shall aim to keep the vehicle in a stable lateral position inside the lane of travel to avoid confusing other road users.
- 5.2.2. The activated system shall detect a vehicle driving beside as defined in paragraph 7.1.2. and, if necessary, adjust the speed and/or the lateral position of the vehicle within its lane as appropriate.
- 5.2.3. The activated system shall control the speed of the vehicle.
- 5.2.3.1. The maximum speed up to which the system is permitted to operate is 60 km/h.
- 5.2.3.2. The activated system shall adapt the vehicle speed to infrastructural and environmental conditions (e.g. narrow curve radii, inclement weather).
- 5.2.3.3. The activated system shall detect the distance to the next vehicle in front as defined in paragraph 7.1.1. and shall adapt the vehicle speed in order to avoid collision.

While the ALKS vehicle is not at standstill, the system shall adapt the speed to adjust the distance to a vehicle in front in the same lane to be equal or greater than the minimum following distance.

In case the minimum time gap cannot be respected temporarily because of other road users (e.g. vehicle is cutting in, decelerating lead vehicle, etc.), the vehicle shall readjust the minimum following distance at the next available opportunity without any harsh braking unless an emergency manoeuvre would become necessary.

The minimum following distance shall be calculated using the formula:

$$d_{\min} = v_{\text{ALKS}} * t_{\text{front}}$$

Where:

- d_{\min} = the minimum following distance
 v_{ALKS} = the present speed of the ALKS vehicle in m/s
 t_{front} = minimum time gap in seconds between the ALKS vehicle and a leading vehicle in front as per the table below:

<i>Present speed of the ALKS vehicle</i>		<i>Minimum time gap</i>	<i>Minimum following distance</i>
(km/h)	(m/s)	(s)	(m)
7.2	2.0	1.0	2.0
10	2.78	1.1	3.1
20	5.56	1.2	6.7
30	8.33	1.3	10.8
40	11.11	1.4	15.6
50	13.89	1.5	20.8
60	16.67	1.6	26.7

For speed values not mentioned in the table, linear interpolation shall be applied.

Notwithstanding the result of the formula above for present speeds below 2 m/s the minimum following distance shall never be less than 2 m.

5.2.4. The activated system shall be able to bring the vehicle to a complete stop behind a stationary vehicle, a road user or a blocked lane of travel. This shall be ensured up to the maximum operational speed of the system.

5.2.5. The activated system shall detect the risk of an imminent collision e.g. with another road user ahead or beside the vehicle, due to a harsh decelerating lead vehicle, a suddenly cutting in vehicle or a suddenly appearing obstacle and shall automatically perform an appropriate emergency manoeuvre as specified in paragraph 5.3.

The system shall not deactivate or unreasonably switch the control strategy under conditions not tested in Annex 5. This shall be demonstrated in accordance with Annex 4 of this Regulation.

5.2.5.1. The activated system shall avoid a collision with a leading vehicle which decelerates up to its full braking performance provided that there was no undercut of the minimum following distance the ALKS vehicle would adjust to a leading vehicle at the present speed due to a cut in manoeuvre of this lead vehicle.

5.2.5.2. The activated system shall detect the risk of an imminent collision with a suddenly cutting in vehicle and avoid a collision,

- provided the cutting in vehicle maintains its longitudinal speed and

- [provided that the cutting in vehicle has been clearly visible to the ALKS vehicle's sensors for a time of at least 0.72 seconds, ³]

- when the distance between the vehicle's front and the cutting in road user's rear corresponds to a TTC calculated by the following equation:

$$TTCLaneIntrusion > vrel/(2 \cdot 6m/s^2) + [0.35s] \quad 4$$

Where:

vrel = relative velocity between both vehicles, positive for vehicle being faster than the cutting in vehicle

TTCLaneIntrusion = The TTC value when the outside of the tyre of the intruding vehicle's front wheel closest to the lane markings crosses a line 0.3 m beyond the outside edge of the visible lane marking to which the intruding vehicle is being drifted.

5.2.5.3. The activated system shall detect the risk of an imminent collision with an unobstructed crossing adult pedestrian in front of the vehicle and avoid a collision. This shall be tested according to the test procedure in UN Regulation No. 152.

5.2.5.4. It is recognised that the fulfilment of the requirement in paragraph 5.2.5. may not be fully achieved in other conditions than those described above. However, the system shall not deactivate or unreasonably switch the control strategy in these other conditions. This shall be demonstrated in accordance with Annex 4 of this Regulation.

5.3. Emergency Manoeuvre (EM)

The fulfilment of the provisions of this paragraph shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer to the technical service during the inspection of the safety approach as part of the assessment to Annex 4 and according to the relevant tests in Annex 5. ⁵

5.3.1. An emergency manoeuvre shall be carried out in case of an imminent collision risk as described in paragraph 5.2.5.

5.3.1.1. Any longitudinal deceleration demand of more than 5.0 m/s² of the system shall be considered to be an EM.

5.3.2. ⁶ This manoeuvre shall decelerate the vehicle up to its full braking performance if necessary and/or may perform an automatic evasive manoeuvre, when appropriate.

If failures are affecting the braking or steering performance of the system, the manoeuvre shall be carried out with consideration for the remaining performance.

During the evasive manoeuvre the ALKS vehicle shall not cross the lane marking (outer edge of the front tyre to outer edge of the lane marking).

After the evasive manoeuvre the vehicle shall aim at resuming a stable position.

5.3.3. An emergency manoeuvre shall not be terminated, unless the imminent collision risk disappeared or the driver deactivated the system.

[³ See GRVA-05-44, Page 3, 820 ms delay minus the delay of 100 ms which has already been taken into account in the equation.]

⁴ Parameters defining a manoeuvre that shall be avoided have to be reviewed.

⁵ Requirement possibly moved to different section.

⁶ Possibility of lane change is expected once appropriate technical requirements for such a function is established.

- 5.3.3.1. After an emergency manoeuvre is terminated the system shall continue to operate.
- 5.3.3.2. If the emergency manoeuvre results in the vehicle being at standstill, the signal to activate the hazard warning lights shall be generated. If the vehicle automatically drives off again, the signal to deactivate the hazard warning lights shall be generated automatically.
- 5.3.4. The vehicle shall implement a logic signal indicating emergency braking as specified in UN Regulation No. 13-H.
- 5.4. Transition demand and system operation during transition phase
The fulfilment of the provisions of this paragraph shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer to the technical service during the inspection of the safety approach as part of the assessment to Annex 4 and according to the relevant tests in Annex 5.⁷
- 5.4.1. The activated system shall recognise all situations in which it needs to transition the control back to the driver.
Types of situations in which the vehicle will generate a transition demand to the driver shall be declared by the vehicle manufacturer and included in the documentation package required in Annex 4.
- 5.4.2. The initiation of the transition demand shall be such that sufficient time is provided for a safe transition to manual driving.
- 5.4.2.1. In case of a planned event that would prevent the ALKS from continuing the operation, a transition demand shall be given early enough to ensure the minimal risk maneuver, in case the driver would not resume control, would bring the vehicle to standstill before the planned event occurs.
- 5.4.2.2. In case of an unplanned event, a transition demand shall be given upon detection.
- 5.4.2.3. In case of any failure affecting the operation of the system, the system shall immediately initiate a transition demand upon detection.
- 5.4.3. During the transition phase the system shall continue to operate. The system may reduce the speed of the vehicle to ensure its safe operation but shall not bring it to standstill unless required by the situation (e.g. due to vehicles or obstacles obstructing the path of the vehicle) or when caused by a haptic warning according to paragraph 6.4.1 started at speeds below 20km/h.
- 5.4.3.1. Once in standstill the vehicle may remain in this condition and shall generate the signal to activate the hazard warning lights within 5 s.
- 5.4.3.2. During the transition phase, the transition demand shall be escalated latest after 4 s after the start of the transition demand.
- 5.4.4. A transition demand shall only be terminated once the system is deactivated or a minimum risk manoeuvre has started.
- 5.4.4.1. In case the driver is not responding to a transition demand by deactivating the system (either as described in paragraph 6.2.4. or 6.2.5.), a minimum risk manoeuvre shall be started, earliest 10 s after the start of the transition demand.
- 5.4.4.1.1. Notwithstanding paragraph 5.4.4.1. a minimum risk manoeuvre may be initiated immediately in case of a severe ALKS or severe vehicle failure.
In case of a severe ALKS or vehicle failure the ALKS may no longer be capable of fulfilling the requirements of this Regulation, but it shall aim at enabling a safe transition of control back to the driver.

⁷ Requirement possibly moved to different section.

- 5.4.4.1.2. The manufacturer shall declare the types of severe vehicle failures and severe ALKS failures that will lead the ALKS to initiate a MRM immediately.
- 5.5. Minimum Risk Manoeuvre (MRM)
- The fulfilment of the provisions of this paragraph shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer to the technical service during the inspection of the safety approach as part of the assessment to Annex 4 and according to the relevant tests in Annex 5.⁸
- 5.5.1.⁹ During the minimum risk manoeuvre the vehicle shall be slowed down inside the lane or, in case the lane markings are not visible, remain on an appropriate trajectory taking into account surrounding traffic and road infrastructure, with an aim of achieving a deceleration demand not greater than 4.0 m/s².
- Higher deceleration demand values are permissible for very short durations, e.g. as haptic warning to stimulate the driver's attention, or in case of a severe ALKS or severe vehicle failure.
- Additionally, the signal to activate the hazard warning lights shall be generated with the start of the minimum risk manoeuvre.
- 5.5.2. The minimum risk manoeuvre shall bring the vehicle to standstill unless the system is deactivated by the driver during the manoeuvre.
- 5.5.4. A minimum risk manoeuvre shall only be terminated once the system is deactivated or the system has brought the vehicle to a standstill.
- 5.5.5. The system shall be deactivated at the end of any minimum risk manoeuvre.
- The hazard warning lights shall remain activated unless deactivated manually and the vehicle shall not move away after standstill without manual input.
- 5.5.6. Reactivation of the system after the end of any minimum risk manoeuvre shall only be possible after each new engine start/run cycle.

6. Human Machine Interface/Operator Information

- 6.1. Driver Availability Recognition System
- The fulfilment of the provisions of this paragraph shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer to the technical service during the inspection of the safety approach as part of the assessment to Annex 4 and according to the relevant tests in Annex 5.¹⁰
- 6.1.1. The system shall comprise a driver availability recognition system.
- The driver availability recognition system shall detect if the driver is present in a driving position, if the safety belt of the driver is fastened and if the driver is available to take over the driving task.
- 6.1.2. Driver presence
- A transition demand shall be initiated according to paragraph 5.4. if any of the following conditions is met:
- When the driver is detected not to be in the seat for a period of more than one second; or
 - When the driver's safety belt is unbuckled.

⁸ Requirement possibly moved to different section.

⁹ Possibility of lane change is expected once appropriate technical requirements for such a function is established.

¹⁰ Requirement possibly moved to different section.

The second level warning of the safety-belt reminder according to UN-R16 may be used instead of an acoustic warning of the Transition Demand.

6.1.3. Driver availability

The system shall detect if the driver is available and in an appropriate driving position to respond to a transition demand by monitoring the driver.

The manufacturer shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the technical service the vehicle’s capability to detect that the driver is available to take over the driving task.


6.1.3.1. Criteria for deeming driver availability

The driver shall be deemed to be unavailable unless at least two availability criteria (e.g. input to driver-exclusive vehicle control, eye blinking, eye closure, conscious head or body movement) have individually determined that the driver is available in the last 30 seconds.

At any time, the system may deem the driver unavailable.

As soon as the driver is deemed to be unavailable, or fewer than two availability criteria can be monitored, the system shall immediately provide a distinctive warning until appropriate actions of the driver are detected or until a transition demand is initiated. At the latest, a transition demand shall be initiated according to paragraph 5.4. if this warning continues for 15s.

Justification for the number and combination of availability criteria, in particular with regard to the corresponding time interval, shall be provided by the manufacturer by documented evidence. However, the time interval required for any availability criteria shall not exceed 30 seconds. This shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer and assessed by the technical service according to Annex 4.



[6.1.4. Other activities than driving that are provided by the vehicle to the driver once the ALKS is activated, shall be automatically suspended as soon as the system issues a transition demand or is deactivated whichever comes first.]¹¹

6.2. Activation, Deactivation and Driver Input

The fulfilment of the provisions of this paragraph shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer to the technical service during the inspection of the safety approach as part of the assessment to Annex 4 and according to the relevant tests in Annex 5.¹²

¹¹ To be shared with the Global Forum for Road Traffic Safety (WP.1)

¹² Requirement possibly moved to different section.

- 6.2.1. The vehicle shall be equipped with dedicated means for the driver to activate (active mode) and deactivate (off mode) the system. This shall be permanently visible to the driver.
- 6.2.2. The default status of the system shall be the off mode at the initiation of each new engine start/run cycle.
This requirement does not apply when a new engine start/run cycle is performed automatically, e.g. by the operation of a stop/start system.
- 6.2.3. The system shall become active only upon a deliberate action by the driver and if all the following conditions are met:
- The driver is in the driver seat and the driver's safety belt is fastened according to paragraphs 6.1.1. and 6.1.2.;
 - The driver is available to take over control of the DDT according to paragraph 6.1.3.;
 - No failure affecting the safe operation or the functionality of the ALKS is present;
 - DSSAD is operational;
 - The environmental and infrastructural conditions allow the operation;
 - Positive confirmation of system self-check; and
 - The vehicle is on roads where pedestrians and cyclists are prohibited and which, by design, are equipped with a physical separation that divides the traffic moving in opposite directions and prevent traffic from cutting across the path of the vehicle.
- If any of the above conditions is no longer fulfilled, the system shall immediately initiate a transition demand unless specified differently in this Regulation.
- 6.2.4. It shall be possible to manually deactivate (off-mode) the system by an intentional action of the driver using the same means as to activate the system, as mentioned in paragraph 6.2.1.
The means of deactivating shall provide protection against unintentional manual deactivation for example by requiring a single input exceeding a certain threshold of time or a double press, or two separate but simultaneous inputs.
Additionally, it shall be ensured the driver is in lateral control of the vehicle at the time of the deactivation, by e.g. placing the deactivation means on the steering control or confirming the driver is holding the steering control.
- 6.2.5. In addition to paragraph 6.2.4., the system shall not be deactivated by any driver input other than those described below in paragraphs 6.2.5.1. to 6.2.5.4.
- 6.2.5.1. Deactivation by input to driving controls
The system shall be deactivated when at least one of the following conditions is met:
- The driver overrides the system by steering while holding the steering control and this override is not suppressed, as specified in paragraph 6.3.; or
 - The driver is holding the steering control and overrides the system by braking or accelerating, as specified in paragraph 6.3.1. below.
- 6.2.5.2. Deactivation during an ongoing transition demand or an ongoing minimum risk manoeuvre
In case a transition demand or a minimum risk manoeuvre is on-going, the system shall only be deactivated:
- As defined in paragraph 6.2.5.1. or

- Upon detection that the driver has taken hold of the steering control as a response to the transition demand or the minimum risk manoeuvre and provided the system confirms the driver is attentive as defined in paragraph 6.3.1.1.
- 6.2.5.3. Deactivation during an ongoing emergency manoeuvre
- In case of an ongoing emergency manoeuvre, the deactivation of the system may be delayed until the imminent collision risk disappeared.
- 6.2.5.4. Deactivation in case of a severe vehicle failure or a severe ALKS failure
- In case of a severe vehicle failure or a severe ALKS failure the ALKS may employ different strategies with regard to deactivation.
- These different strategies shall be declared by the manufacturer and their effectiveness shall be assessed by the Technical Service with regard to ensuring a safe transition of control from the system to the human driver according to Annex 4.
- 6.2.6. On deactivation of the system, there shall not be an automatic transition to any function, which provides continuous longitudinal and/or lateral movement of the vehicle (e.g. ACSF of Category B1 function).
- After deactivation, Corrective Steering Function (CSF) may be active with the aim at accustoming the driver to execute the lateral control task by gradually reducing lateral support.
- Notwithstanding both paragraphs above, any other safety system delivering longitudinal or lateral support in accident-prone situations (e.g. Advanced Emergency Braking System (AEBS), Electronic Stability Control (ESC), Brake Assist System (BAS) or Emergency Steering Function (ESF)) shall not be deactivated in case of deactivation of ALKS.
- 6.2.7. Any deactivation shall be indicated to the driver as defined in paragraph 6.4.2.3.
- 6.3. System override
- 6.3.1. A driver input to the steering control shall override the lateral control function of the system when the input exceeds a reasonable threshold designed to prevent unintentional override.
- This threshold shall include a specified force and duration and shall vary depending on parameters that include criteria used for driver attentiveness to be checked during the drivers input as defined in paragraph 6.3.1.1.
- These thresholds and the rationale for any variation shall be demonstrated to the Technical Service during the assessment according to Annex 4.
- 6.3.1.1. Driver attentiveness
- The system shall detect if the driver is attentive. The driver is deemed to be attentive when at least one of the following criteria is met:
- Driver gaze direction is confirmed as primarily looking at the road ahead;
 - Driver gaze direction is being confirmed as looking at the rear-view mirrors; or,
 - Driver head movement is confirmed as primarily directed towards the driving task.
- The specification for confirming these or equally safe criteria must be declared by the manufacturer and supported by documented evidence. This shall be assessed by the technical service according to Annex 4.
- 6.3.2. A driver input to the braking control resulting in a higher deceleration than that induced by the system or maintaining the vehicle in standstill by any braking system, shall override the longitudinal control function of the system.

- 6.3.3. A driver input to the accelerator control may override the longitudinal control function of the system. However, such an input shall not cause the system to no longer meet the requirements of this Regulation.
- 6.3.4. Any driver input to the accelerator or brake control shall immediately initiate a transition demand as specified in paragraph 5.4., when the input exceeds a reasonable threshold designed to prevent unintentional input.
- 6.3.5. Notwithstanding the provisions laid down in paragraphs 6.3.1. to 6.3.3., the effect of the driver input on any control may be reduced or suppressed by the system in case the system has detected an imminent collision risk due to this driver input.
- 6.3.6. In case of a severe vehicle failure or a severe ALKS failure the ALKS may employ different strategies with regard to system override. These different strategies shall be declared by the manufacturer and their effectiveness shall be assessed by the Technical Service with regard to ensuring a safe transition of control from the system to the human driver.
- 6.3.7. The fulfilment of the provisions in paragraph 6.3 and its subparagraphs shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer to the technical service during the inspection of the safety approach as part of the assessment to Annex 4.
- 6.4. Information to the driver
- 6.4.1. The following information shall be indicated to the driver:
- The system status as defined in paragraph 6.4.2.
 - Any failure affecting the operation of the system with at least an optical signal unless the system is deactivated (off mode),
 - Transition demand by at least an optical and in addition an acoustic and/or haptic warning signal.
- At the latest 4 s after the initiation of the transition demand, the transition demand shall:
- Contain a constant or intermittent haptic warning unless the vehicle is at standstill; and
 - Be escalated and remain escalated until the transition demand ends.
- Minimum risk manoeuvre by at least an optical signal and in addition an acoustic and/or a haptic warning signal and
 - Emergency manoeuvre by an optical signal
- The optical signals above shall be in an adequate size and contrast. The acoustic signals above shall be loud and clear.
- 6.4.2. System status
- 6.4.2.1. System unavailability indication
- In case activation of the system following the deliberate action of the driver is denied by the system due to system unavailability, this shall be at least visually displayed to the driver.
- 6.4.2.2. System status display when activated
- Upon activation the system status (active mode) shall be displayed by a dedicated optical signal to the driver.
- The optical signal shall contain an unambiguous indication including
- a) a steering control or a vehicle, with an additional “A” or “AUTO,” or the standardized symbols in accordance with Regulation 121, and additionally
 - b) an easily perceptible indication in the peripheral field of vision and located near the direct line of driver’s sight to the outside in front of the

vehicle, e.g. prominent indication in the instrument cluster or on the steering control covering part of the outer rim perimeter facing towards the driver.

The optical signal shall indicate the active system state until the system is deactivated (off mode).

The optical signal shall be constant while the system is in regular operation and with the initiation of a transition demand at least the indication according to b) shall change its characteristics, e.g. to an intermittent signal or a different colour.

When an intermittent signal is used, a low frequency shall be used in order to not unreasonably alert the driver.

During the transition phase and minimum risk manoeuvre, the indication according to a) may be replaced by the instruction to take over manual control according to paragraph 6.4.3.

6.4.2.3. System status display when deactivated

Upon deactivation when the system status changes from active mode to (off mode) this shall be indicated to the driver by at least an optical warning signal. This optical signal shall be realized by non-displaying the optical signal used to indicate the active mode.

Additionally, an acoustic warning signal shall be provided unless the system is deactivated following a transition demand which contained an acoustic signal.

6.4.3. Transition Phase and Minimum Risk Manoeuvre

During the transition phase and the minimum risk manoeuvre, the system shall instruct the driver in an intuitive and unambiguous way to take over manual control of the vehicle. The instruction shall include a pictorial information showing hands and the steering control and may be accompanied by additional explanatory text or warning symbols, as shown in the example below.



Example 1.

Example 2.

6.4.3.2. With the start of the minimum risk manoeuvre, the given signal shall change its characteristics to emphasize the urgency of an action by the driver. e.g. by red flashing of the steering control and moving hands of the pictorial information.

6.4.4. Where examples are given above, an adequate and equally perceptible interface design for the optical signals may be used instead. This shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer and shall be supported by documented evidence. This shall be assessed by the Technical Service according to Annex 4.

6.4.5. Prioritization of ALKS warnings

The warnings of an ALKS during a transition phase, a Minimal Risk Manoeuvre or an Emergency Manoeuvre may be prioritized over other warnings in the vehicle.

The prioritization of different acoustic and optical warnings during the ALKS operation shall be declared by the manufacturer to the Technical Service during Type Approval.

7. Object Event Detection and Response (OEDR)

7.1. Sensing requirements

The ALKS vehicle shall be equipped with a sensing system such that, it can at least determine the driving environment (e.g. road geometry ahead, lane markings) and the traffic dynamics:

- 1) Across the full width of its own traffic lane, the full width of the traffic lanes immediately to its left and to its right, up to the limit of the forward detection range;
- 2) Along the full length of the vehicle and up to the limit of the lateral detection range.

The requirements of this paragraph are without prejudice to other requirements in the regulation, most notably paragraph 5.1.1.

7.1.1. Forward detection range

The manufacturer shall declare the forward detection range measured from the forward most point of the vehicle. This declared value shall be at least 46 metres.

The Technical Service shall verify that the distance at which the vehicle sensing system detects a road user during the relevant test in Annex 5 is equal or greater than the declared value.

7.1.2. Lateral detection range

The manufacturer shall declare the lateral detection range. The declared range shall be sufficient to cover the full width of the lane immediately to the left and of the lane immediately to the right of the vehicle.

The Technical Service shall verify that the vehicle sensing system detects vehicles during the relevant test in Annex 5. This range shall be equal or greater than the declared range.

7.1.3. The ALKS shall implement strategies to detect and compensate for environmental conditions that reduce the detection range, e.g. prevent enabling the system, disabling the system and transferring the control back to the driver, reducing the speed when visibility is too low. These strategies shall be described by the manufacturer and assessed according to Annex 4.

7.1.4. The vehicle manufacturer shall provide evidence that the effects of wear and ageing do not reduce the performance of the sensing system below the minimum required value specified in paragraph 7.1. over the lifetime of the system/vehicle.

7.1.5. The fulfilment of the provisions of paragraph 7.1. and its subparagraphs shall be demonstrated to the technical service and tested according to the relevant tests in Annex 5.

7.1.6. A single perception malfunction without failure should not induce hazardous event. The design strategies put in place shall be described by the vehicle manufacturer and their safety shall be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the technical service in accordance with Annex 4.

8. Data Storage for Automated Systems (DSSAD)

8.1. Each Vehicles equipped with ALKS shall be fitted with a DSSAD that meets the requirements specified below.

8.2. Recorded occurrences

8.2.1. Each vehicle equipped with a DSSAD shall at least record an entry for each of the following occurrences:

- a) Activation of the system
- b) Deactivation of the system[, due to:]
 - 1. Use of dedicated means for the driver to deactivate the system
 - 2. Override on steering control
 - 3. Override by accelerator control while holding steering control
 - 4. Override by braking control while holding steering control
- c) Transition Demand by the system[, due to:]
 - 1. Planned event
 - 2. Unplanned event
 - 3. Driver unavailability
 - 4. System failure
 - 5. System override by braking input
 - 6. System override by accelerator input
- d) Suppression of driver input
- e) Emergency Manoeuvre
- ~~f) Detected risk of imminent collision~~
- ~~g) Detected end of imminent risk of collision~~
End of Emergency Manoeuvre
- h) EDR trigger input
- i) ~~Collision detected~~ Involved in a detected collision
Note: This may be reviewed to be in line with 5.1.1.
- j) Minimal Risk Manoeuvre engagement by the system
- k) Severe ALKS failure
- l) Severe vehicle failure
- ~~m) [Detected deviation of lane of travel]~~
- ~~n) [Demist on~~
- ~~o) [Demist off~~
- ~~p) [Windscreen wipers on~~
- ~~q) [Windscreen wipers off~~
- ~~r) [Headlamp on~~
- ~~s) [Headlamp off]~~

Each entry of Occurrences n) – s) shall be recorded if relevant functions are installed on the vehicle.

8.3. Data elements

8.3.1. For each event listed in para. 8.2., the DSSAD shall record the following data elements in a clearly identifiable way:

- The occurrence flag, as listed in ~~section~~ para. 8.2
- Reason for the occurrence, as appropriate, and listed in para. 8.2.
- ~~• Software versions relevant to the system~~
- Date

- Timestamp

For each event listed in para. 8.2., the Software versions relevant to ALKS, or the RxSWIN for ALKS, indicating the software that was present at the time when the event occurred, shall be clearly identifiable.

- 8.3.2. A single timestamp may be allowed for multiple elements recorded simultaneously within the timing resolution of the specific data elements. If more than one element is recorded with the same timestamp, the information from the individual elements should indicate the chronological order.
- 8.4. Data availability
- 8.4.1. DSSAD data shall be available subject to requirements of national and regional law.¹³
- 8.4.2. Once the storage limits of the DSSAD are achieved, existing data may [only] be overwritten following a first in first out procedure with principle of respecting the relevant requirements for data availability.
- 8.4.3. The data shall be retrievable even after an impact of a severity level set by UN Regulations Nos. 94, 95 or 137, ~~or other relevant national crash test procedures~~. If the main on-board vehicle power supply is not available, it shall still be possible to retrieve all data recorded on the DSSAD, as required by national and regional law.
- 8.4.4. ~~Data stored in the DSSAD shall be easily readable in a standardized way via the use of an electronic communication interface, at least through the standard interface (OBD port).~~
- Each manufacturer of a motor vehicle equipped with a DSSAD shall ensure by licensing agreement or other means that a tool(s) is commercially available that is capable of accessing and retrieving the data stored in the DSSAD that are required by this regulation.
- 8.4.5. Instructions from the manufacturer shall be provided on how to access the data.
- 8.5. Protection against manipulation.
- 8.5.1. It shall be ensured that there is adequate protection against manipulation of stored data such as anti-tampering design.
- 8.6. Availability of DSSAD operation
- 8.6.1. DSSAD shall be able to communicate with the system to inform that the DSSAD is operational.

9. Cybersecurity and Software-Updates¹⁴

- 9.1. The effectiveness of the system shall not be adversely affected by cyber-attacks, cyber threats and vulnerabilities. The effectiveness of the security measures shall be demonstrated by compliance with Regulation No. [15X].
- 9.2. If the system permits software updates, the effectiveness of the software update procedures and processes shall be demonstrated by compliance with Regulation No. [15X].

RxSWIN

- 9.3. Requirements for software identification
- 9.3.1. For the purpose of ensuring the software of the System can be identified, an RXSWIN may be implemented by the vehicle manufacturer.

¹³ (NOTE: Based on a recent CP data study, the IWG on EDR/DSSAD is considering that the text specifies several timestamps specifications of 2500 timestamps to correspond with a period of 6 months of use.

¹⁴ To be revised in accordance with TF on CS/OTA and subject to GRVA decision.

- 9.3.2. If the manufacturer implements an RXSWIN the following shall apply:
- 9.3.2.1. The vehicle manufacturer shall have a valid approval according to UN Regulation No. xxx [Software Update Process Regulation].
- 9.3.2.2. The vehicle manufacturer shall provide the following information in the communication form of this Regulation:
- The RXSWIN
 - How to read the RXSWIN or software version(s) in case the RXSWIN is not held on the vehicle
- 9.3.2.3. The vehicle manufacturer may provide in the communication form of this Regulation a list of the relevant parameters that will allow the identification of those vehicles that can be updated with the software represented by the RXSWIN. The information provided shall be declared by the vehicle manufacturer and may not be verified by an Approval Authority.
- 9.3.3. The vehicle manufacturer may obtain a new vehicle approval for the purpose of differentiating software versions intended to be used on vehicles already registered in the market from the software versions that are used on new vehicles. This may cover the situations where type approval regulations are updated or hardware changes are made to vehicles in series production. In agreement with the testing agency, duplication of tests shall be avoided where possible.

10. Modification of vehicle type and extension of approval

- 10.1. Every modification to an existing vehicle type shall be notified to the Type Approval Authority which approved the vehicle type.
- The Authority shall then either:
- (a) Decide, in consultation with the manufacturer, that a new type-approval is to be granted; or
 - (b) Apply the procedure contained in paragraph 10.1.1. (Revision) and, if applicable, the procedure contained in paragraph 10.1.2. (Extension).
- 10.1.1. Revision
- When particulars recorded in the information documents have changed and the Type Approval Authority considers that the modifications made are unlikely to have appreciable adverse effects and that in any case the foot controls still meet the requirements, the modification shall be designated a “revision”.
- In such a case, the Type Approval Authority shall issue the revised pages of the information documents as necessary, marking each revised page to show clearly the nature of the modification and the date of re-issue.
- A consolidated, updated version of the information documents, accompanied by a detailed description of the modification, shall be deemed to meet this requirement.
- 10.1.2. Extension
- The modification shall be designated an “extension” if, in addition to the change of the particulars recorded in the information documents,
- (a) Further inspections or tests are required; or
 - (b) Any information on the communication document (with the exception of its attachments) has changed; or
 - (c) Approval to a later series of amendments is requested after its entry into force.

- 10.2. Confirmation or refusal of approval, specifying the alteration, shall be communicated by the procedure specified in paragraph 4.3. above to the Contracting Parties to the Agreement applying this Regulation. In addition, the index to the information documents and to the test reports, attached to the communication document of Annex 1, shall be amended accordingly to show the date of the most recent revision or extension.
- 10.3. The competent authority issuing the extension of approval shall assign a serial number to each communication form drawn up for such an extension.

11. Conformity of production

- 11.1. Procedures concerning conformity of production shall comply with those set out in the 1958 Agreement, Schedule 1 (E/ECE/TRANS/505/Rev.3) and meet the following requirements:
- 11.2. A vehicle approved pursuant to this Regulation shall be so manufactured as to conform to the type approved by meeting the requirements of this regulation;
- 11.3. The Type Approval Authority which has granted approval may at any time verify the conformity of control methods applicable to each production unit. The normal frequency of such inspections shall be once every two years.

12. Penalties for non-conformity of production

- 12.1. The approval granted in respect of a vehicle type pursuant to this Regulation may be withdrawn if the requirements laid down in paragraph 8, above are not complied with.
- 12.2. If a Contracting Party withdraws an approval it had previously granted, it shall forthwith so notify the other Contracting Parties applying this Regulation by sending them a communication form conforming to the model in Annex 1 to this Regulation.

13. Production definitively discontinued

- 13.1. If the holder of the approval completely ceases to manufacture a type of vehicle approved in accordance with this Regulation, he shall so inform the Type Approval Authority which granted the approval, which in turn shall forthwith inform the other Contracting Parties to the Agreement applying this Regulation by means of a communication form conforming to the model in Annex 1 to this Regulation.

RxSWIN

- 13.2. The production is not considered definitely discontinued if the vehicle manufacturer intends to obtain further approvals for software updates for vehicles already registered in the market.

14. Names and addresses of technical series responsible for conducting approval tests and of Type Approval Authorities

The Contracting Parties to the Agreement applying this Regulation shall communicate to the United Nations Secretariat¹⁵ the names and addresses of the Technical Services responsible for conducting approval tests and of the

¹⁵ Through the online platform (“/343 Application”) provided by UNECE and dedicated to the exchange of such information: <https://www.unece.org/trans/main/wp29/datasharing.html>

Type Approval Authorities which grant approval and to which forms certifying approval or extension or refusal or withdrawal of approval are to be sent.

Annex 1¹


Communication

(Maximum format: A4 (210 x 297 mm))

²

issued by:

Name of administration:



.....
.....
.....

Concerning:³

- Approval granted
- Approval extended
- Approval refused
- Approval withdrawn
- Production definitively discontinued

of a vehicle type with regard to steering equipment pursuant to UN Regulation No. [15X]

Approval No.

Reason for extension or revision:

1. Trade name or mark of vehicle
2. Vehicle type
3. Manufacturer's name and address
4. If applicable, name and address of manufacturer's representative
5. General construction characteristics of the vehicle:
 - 5.1 Photographs and/or drawings of a representative vehicle:
6. Description and/or drawing of the ALKS including:
 - 6.1 Specified maximum speed of the ALKS declared by the manufacturer:
 - 6.2 Sensing system (incl. components):
 - 6.3 Installation of the ALKS sensing system:
 - 6.4 Software Identification of the ALKS (if applicable):
7. Written description and/or drawing of the ALKS Human Machine Interface including:
 - 7.1 Methods to detect driver availability
 - 7.2 Means to activate/deactivate the system
 - 7.3 Methods to determine driver attentiveness
8. Written description and/or drawing of the information given to the driver including:
 - 8.1 System status:

¹ Needs revision and consistency check.

² Distinguishing number of the country which has granted/extended/refused/withdrawn approval (see approval provisions in this Regulation).

³ Strike out what does not apply.

- 8.2 Transition demand:
- 8.3. Minimum Risk Manoeuvre:
- 8.4. Emergency Manoeuvre:
9. Data Storage for Automated Systems (DSSAD):
 - 9.1. DSSAD Type Approval Number⁴.....
10. Cyber Security and Software updates⁵
 - 10.1 Cyber Security Type Approval Number (if applicable):
 - 10.2 Software Update Type approval number (if applicable):
11. Special requirements to be applied to the safety aspects of electronic control systems (Annex 4)
 - 11.1 Manufacturers document reference for Annex 4 (including version number):
12. Technical Service responsible for conducting approval tests
- 12.1. Date of report issued by that service
- 12.2. Number of report issued by that service
13. Approval granted/extended/revised/refused/withdrawn²
14. Position of approval mark on vehicle.....
15. Place.....
16. Date.....
17. Signature
18. Annexed to this communication is a list of documents in the approval file deposited at the administration services having delivered the approval and which can be obtained upon request.
19. RXSWIN:
- 19.1. Information on how to read the RXSWIN or software version(s) in case the RXSWIN is not held on the vehicle:
- 19.2. If applicable, list the relevant parameters that will allow the identification of those vehicles that can be updated with the software represented by the RXSWIN under item 19.1.:

⁴ Align with work of IWG on EDR/DSSAD

⁵ Align with work of TF on CS/OTA

Appendix

Addendum to Type approval Communication No ... concerning the type approval of a vehicle type with regard to ALKS pursuant to Regulation No. [15X]

1. Additional information

1.1 Contracting Party regions where the manufacturer of the ALKS has declared that the ALKS been assessed to comply with local traffic rules:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Assessed</i>	<i>Comments on any restrictions</i>
E 1 Germany	Yes/No	
E 2 France		
E 3 Italy		
E 4 Netherlands		
E 5 Sweden		
E 6 Belgium		
E 7 Hungary		
E 8 Czech Republic		
E 9 Spain		
E 10 Serbia		
E 11 United Kingdom		
E 12 Austria		
E 13 Luxembourg		
E 14 Switzerland		
E 16 Norway		
E 17 Finland		
E 18 Denmark		
E 19 Romania		
E 20 Poland		
E 21 Portugal		
E 22 Russian Federation		
E 23 Greece		
E 24 Ireland		
E 25 Croatia		
E 26 Slovenia		
E 27 Slovakia		
E 28 Belarus		

<i>Country</i>	<i>Assessed</i>	<i>Comments on any restrictions</i>
E 29 Estonia		
E 30 Republic of Moldova		
E 31 Bosnia and Herzegovina		
E 32 Latvia		
E 34 Bulgaria		
E 35 Kazakhstan		
E 36 Lithuania		
E 37 Turkey		
E 39 Azerbaijan		
E 40 North Macedonia		
E 43 Japan		
E 45 Australia		
E 46 Ukraine		
E 47 South Africa		
E 48 New Zealand		
E 49 Cyprus		
E 50 Malta		
E 51 Republic of Korea		
E 52 Malaysia		
E 53 Thailand		
E 54 Albania		
E 55 Armenia		
E 56 Montenegro		
E 57 San Marino		
E 58 Tunisia		
E 60 Georgia		
E 62 Egypt		
E 63 Nigeria		

*


* The list of Contracting Parties applying UN Regulation No. [15X] is available online:
[https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XI-B-16-\[15X\]&chapter=11&clang=_en](https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XI-B-16-[15X]&chapter=11&clang=_en)

Annex 2

Arrangements of approval marks

Model A

(See paragraph 4.4. of this Regulation)




$a = 8 \text{ mm min}$

The above approval mark affixed to a vehicle shows that the vehicle type concerned has, with regard to ALKS, been approved in the Netherlands (E 4) pursuant to UN Regulation No. [15X] under approval No. 002439. The approval number indicates that the approval was granted in accordance with the requirements of UN Regulation No. [15X].

Model B

(See paragraph 4.5. of this Regulation)



$a = 8 \text{ mm min}$

The above approval mark affixed to a vehicle shows that the vehicle type concerned has been approved in the Netherlands (E 4) pursuant to Regulations Nos. [15X] and 31.¹ The approval numbers indicate that, at the dates when the respective approvals were given, UN Regulation No. [15X] was in its original form and UN Regulation No. 31 included the 02 series of amendments.

¹ The second number is given merely as an example.

Annex 3

System information data

The following data shall be provided, together with the documentation package required in Annex 3.2.1. of this UN Regulation, to the Technical Service at the time of type approval.

- 1.1. A list of types of situations in which the vehicle may generate a transition demand to the driver.
- 1.2. Information about how the system detects that the driver is available to take over the control.¹
- 1.3. The means to monitor the driving environment.
- 1.4. The means to activate, override or deactivate the system including the strategy how the system is protected against unintentional deactivation, the threshold values for a steering override and how the system assesses that the driver has directed his gaze to the driving task.
- 1.5.² Information about how the software version(s) and the failure warning signal status can be readable in a standardized way via the use of an electronic communication interface, at least be the standard interface (OBD port).
- 1.6. Description of the types of severe vehicle failures and severe ALKS failures that will lead the ALKS to initiate a MRM immediately.
- 1.7. For driving situations not covered by the tests of Annex 5, the safe operation of the system shall be demonstrated by the vehicle manufacturer on the base of Annex 4 of this Regulation.
- 1.8. Installation

The manufacturer shall provide information regarding the installation options that will be employed for the individual components that comprise the sensing system. These options shall include, but are not limited to, the location of the component in/on the vehicle, the material(s) surrounding the component, the dimensioning and geometry of the material surrounding the component, and the surface finish of the materials surrounding the component, once installed in the vehicle. The information shall also include installation specifications that are critical to the system's performance, e.g. tolerances on installation angle.

Changes to the individual components of the sensing system, or the installation options, shall be notified to the Type Approval Authority and be subject to further assessment.
- 1.9. The system behaviour during a MRM.
- 1.10. The system behaviour during an EM.

¹ Could also be part of Annex 4.

² Reference with regard to RxSWIN will be added when relevant UN Regulation is adopted.

[Annex 3] – Appendix 1

Model assessment form for automated driving systems

Test report No:

1. Identification

- 1.1. Make:
- 1.2. System Type:
- 1.3. Means of system identification on the vehicle:
- 1.4. Location of that marking:.....
- 1.5. Manufacturer's name and address:.....
- 1.6. If applicable, name and address of manufacturer's representative:.....
- 1.7. Manufacturer's formal documentation package:
Documentation reference No:
Date of original issue:
Date of latest update:

2. Test vehicle(s)/system(s) description

- 2.1. General description:
- 2.2. Description of all the control functions of "The System", and methods of operation: .
- 2.3. Description of the components and diagrams of the interconnections within "The System":
- 2.4. General description:
- 2.5. Description of all the control functions of "The System", and methods of operation: .
- 2.6. Description of the components and diagrams of the interconnections within "The System":.....

3. Manufacturer's safety concept

- 3.1. Description of signal flow and operating data and their priorities:
- 3.2. Manufacturer's declaration:

The manufacturer(s) affirm(s) that the "The System" is free from unreasonable risks for the driver, passengers and other road users.
- 3.3. Software outline architecture and the design methods and tools used:
- 3.4. Explanation of design provisions built into "The System":.....
- 3.5. Documented analyses of the behaviour of "The System" under individual hazard or fault conditions:

- 3.6. Description of the measures in place for environmental conditions:
- 3.7. Provisions for the periodic technical inspection of “The System”:.....
- 3.8. Results of “The System” verification test, as per para. 4.1.1. of Annex 4 to
UN Regulation No. [15X]:.....
- 3.9. Results of safety concept verification test, as per para. 4.1.2. of Annex 4 to
UN Regulation No. [15X]:.....
- 3.10. Date of test(s):.....
- 3.11. This test(s) has been carried out and the results reported in accordance with to
UN Regulation No. [15X] as last amended by the series of amendments.
- Technical Service carrying out the test
Signed: Date:
- 3.12. Comments:

[Annex 3] – Appendix 2

- 1. System description Automated Lane Keeping System**
 - 1.1. Operational Design Domain (Speed, road type, country, Environment, Road conditions, etc)/ Boundary conditions/ Main conditions for Minimum risk manoeuvres and transition demands
 - 1.2. Basic Performance (e.g. Object and Event Detection and Response (OEDR) ...)
 - 1.4. The means to activate, override or deactivate the system.
 - 1.5. Expected driver's tasks within the ODD and when going out of the ODD.

- 2. Description of the functions of “The System” including control strategies**
 - 2.1. Main automated Driving Functions (functional architecture, environmental perception).
 - 2.1.1. Vehicle-internal
 - 2.1.2. Vehicle-external (e.g. backend)

- 3. Overview major components (units) of “The System”**
 - 3.1. Control Units
 - 3.2. Sensors
 - 3.3. Maps/Positioning

- 4. System layout and schematics**
 - 4.1. Schematic system layout including sensors for the environmental perception
 - 4.2. List and schematic overview of interconnections
 - 4.3. List of major input variables
 - 4.4. List of major output variables
 - 4.5. Signal flow and priorities

- 5. Specifications**
 - 5.1. Means to check the correct operational status of the system
 - 5.2. Means implemented to protect against simple unauthorized activation/operation and interventions into the system
 - 5.3. Operational Design Domain (System boundaries)

- 6. Safety Concept**
 - 6.1. Safe Operation – Vehicle Manufacturer Statement
 - 6.2. Outline software architecture
 - 6.3. Means by which the realization of the system logic is determined
 - 6.4. Explanation of the design provisions built into “The System” so as to generate safe operation and interaction with other road users under fault conditions, under operational disturbances and the occurrence of planned/unplanned conditions that would exceed the ODD.
 - 6.5. Failure handling, fall-back level strategy including risk mitigation strategy (minimum risk manoeuvre)
 - 6.6. Analysis on system behaviour on occurrence of faults and operational disturbances
 - 6.7. Driver, vehicle occupants and other road users interaction including warning signals and transition demands to be given to driver.
 - 6.8. Validation by the manufacturer of the performance requirements specified elsewhere in the regulation including the OEDR, the HMI, the respect of traffic rules and the conclusion that that the system is designed in such a way that it is free from unreasonable risks for the driver, vehicle occupants and other road users.

7. Verification and test by the authorities

- 7.1. Verification of the basic function of “The System”
- 7.2. Examples for checking the system reaction under the influence of a failure or a operational disturbance, emergency conditions and boundary conditions

8. EDR/ Data Storage System

- 8.1. Type of Data stored
- 8.2. Storage location
- 8.3. Storage duration
- 8.4. Means to ensure data security and data protection
- 8.5. Access to the data

9. Cyber security (cross reference to the cyber regulation is possible)

- 9.1. Description of the cyber security and software update management scheme
- 9.2. Description of the different risks and measures put in place to mitigate these risks.
- 9.3. Description of the update procedure.

10. Information provisions to users

- 10.1. Model of the information provided to users.
- 10.2. Extract of the relevant part of the owner`s manual

Annex 4 - Still under consideration by the IWG on VMAD but already agreed in principle by GRVA

Special requirements to be applied to the functional and operational safety aspects of automated driving systems

1. General

This annex is intended to ensure that an acceptable thorough consideration of functional and operational safety for the automated driving system has been performed by the manufacturer during the design and development processes and will continue to be done throughout the vehicle type lifecycle (design, development, production, field operation, decommissioning).

It covers the documentation which must be disclosed by the manufacturer to the type-approval authority or the technical Service acting on its behalf (hereafter referred as type-approval authority), for type approval purposes.

This documentation shall demonstrate that “The System” meets the performance requirements specified in this UN Regulation, that it is designed/developed to operate in such a way that the automated driving system is free of unreasonable safety risks to the driver, passengers and other road users.

The type approval authority granting the approval shall verify through targeted spot checks and tests that the argumentation provided by the documentation is strong enough and that the design/processes described in documentation are actually implemented by the manufacturer.

While based on the provided documentation, evidence and process audits/product assessments carried out to the satisfaction of the type approval authority concerning this Regulation, the residual level of risk of the assessed automated driving system is deemed to be acceptable for the entry into service of the vehicle type, the overall vehicle safety during the vehicle lifetime in accordance with the requirements of this regulation remains the responsibility of the manufacturer requesting the type-approval.

2. Definitions

For the purposes of this annex,

- 2.1. “*The System*” means a “*Higher-Level Electronic Control*” system and its *electronic control system(s)* that provide the automated driving function(s) regulated by this Regulation. This also includes any transmission links to or from other systems that are outside the scope of this Regulation, that acts on the function to which this Regulation applies.
- 2.2. “*Safety Concept*” is a description of the measures designed into the system, for example within the electronic units, so that the vehicle operates in such a way that it is free of unreasonable safety risks to the driver, passengers and other road users under faults and non-fault conditions. The possibility of a fallback to partial operation or even to a back-up system for vital vehicle functions shall be a part of the safety concept.
- 2.3. “*Electronic control system*” means a combination of units, designed to cooperate in the production of the stated automated driving function by electronic data processing. Such systems, commonly controlled by software, are built from discrete functional components such as sensors, electronic control units

- and actuators and connected by transmission links. They may include mechanical, electro-pneumatic or electro-hydraulic elements.
- 2.5. “*Higher-Level Electronic Control*” systems are those which employ processing and/or sensing provisions to realize the dynamic driving task.
 - 2.6. “*Units*” are the smallest divisions of system components which will be considered in this annex, since these combinations of components will be treated as single entities for purposes of identification, analysis or replacement.
 - 2.7. “*Transmission links*” are the means used for inter-connecting distributed units for the purpose of conveying signals, operating data or an energy supply. This equipment is generally electrical but may, in some part, be mechanical, pneumatic or hydraulic.
 - 2.8. “*Range of control*” refers to an output variable and defines the range over which the system is likely to exercise control.
 - 2.9. “*Boundary of functional operation*” defines the boundaries of the external physical limits within which the system is able to perform the dynamic driving tasks.
 - 2.9.1. “*Operational Design Domain (ODD)*” of the automated driving system defines the specific operating conditions (e.g. environmental, geographic, time-of-day, traffic, infrastructure, speed range, weather and other conditions) within the boundaries fixed by this regulation under which the automated driving system is designed to operate without any intervention by the driver.
 - 2.10. “*Automated Driving Function*” means a function of “The System” that is capable of performing the dynamic driving tasks of the vehicle.
 - 2.11. “*Control strategy*” means a strategy to ensure robust and safe operation of the function(s) of “The System” in response to a specific set of ambient and/or operating conditions (such as road surface condition, traffic intensity and other road users, adverse weather conditions, etc.). This may include the automatic deactivation of a function or temporary performance restrictions (e.g. a reduction in the maximum operating speed, etc.).
 - 2.12. “*Functional safety*”: absence of unreasonable risks under the occurrence of hazards caused by a malfunctioning behaviour of electric/electronic systems (safety hazards resulting from system faults).
 - 2.13. “*Fault*”: abnormal condition that can cause an element (system, component, software) or an item (system or combination of systems that implement a function of a vehicles) to fail.
 - 2.14. “*Failure*” means the termination of an intended behaviour of an element or an item.
 - 2.13. “*Operational safety*” means the absence of unreasonable risk under the occurrence of hazards resulting from functional insufficiencies of the intended functionality (e.g. false/missed detection), operational disturbances (e.g. environmental conditions like fog, rain, shadows, sunlight) or by reasonably foreseeable misuse by persons (safety hazards — without system faults).
3. Documentation
 - 3.1. Requirements

The manufacturer shall provide a documentation package which gives access to the basic design of “The System” and the means by which it is linked to other vehicle systems or by which it directly controls output variables.

The function(s) of “The System”, including the control strategies, and the safety concept, as laid down by the manufacturer, shall be explained.

Documentation shall be brief, yet provide evidence that the design and development has had the benefit of expertise from all the system fields which are involved.

For periodic technical inspections, the documentation shall describe how the current operational status of “The System” can be checked.

The Type-approval authority shall assess the documentation package to show that “The System” within the declared ODD:

- (a) Is designed and was developed to operate in such a way that it is free from unreasonable risks for the driver, passengers and other road users;
- (b) Respects, under the performance requirements specified elsewhere in this UN Regulation;
- (c) Was developed according to the development process/method declared by the manufacturer and that this includes at least the steps listed in paragraph 3.4.4.
- (d) Is designed to recognize its ODD limits
- (e) Does not operate outside of the declared ODD and any attempt to activate the System outside of the ODD will not lead to activation

3.1.1. Documentation shall be made available in three parts:

- (a) Application for type approval: The information document which is submitted to the type approval authority at the time of type approval application shall contain brief information on the items listed in Appendix 2. It will become part of the approval.
- (b) The formal documentation package for the approval, containing the material listed in this paragraph 3. (with the exception of that of paragraph 3.4.4.) which shall be supplied to the Type Approval Authority for the purpose of conducting the product assessment / process audit. This documentation package shall be used by the Type Approval Authority as the basic reference for the verification process set out in paragraph 4. of this annex. The Type Approval Authority shall ensure that this documentation package remains available for a period determined of at least 10 years counted from the time when production of the vehicle type is definitely discontinued.
- (c) Additional confidential material and analysis data (intellectual property) of paragraph 3.4.4. which shall be retained by the manufacturer, but made open for inspection (e.g. on-site in the engineering facilities of the manufacturer) at the time of the product assessment / process audit. The manufacturer shall ensure that this material and analysis data remains available for a period of 10 years counted from the time when production of the vehicle is definitely discontinued.

3.2. Description of the functions of “The System” including control strategies

A description shall be provided which gives a simple explanation of all the functions including control strategies of “The System” and the methods employed to perform the dynamic driving tasks within the boundaries under which the automated driving system is designed to operate, including a statement of the mechanism(s) by which control is exercised. The manufacturer shall describe the interactions expected between the system with the driver, vehicle occupants and other road users.

Any enabled or disabled automated driving functions providing when the hardware and software are present in the vehicle at the time of production, shall be declared and are subject to the requirements of this annex, prior to their use in the vehicle. The manufacturer shall also document the data processing in case of continuous learning implemented.

- 3.2.1. A list of all input and sensed variables shall be provided and the working range of these defined, along with a description of how each variable affects system behaviour.”
- 3.2.2. A list of all output variables which are controlled by “The System” shall be provided and an indication given, in each case, of whether the control is direct or via another vehicle system. The range of control (paragraph 2.7.) exercised on each such variable shall be defined.
- 3.2.3. Limits defining the boundaries of functional operation including ODD-limits shall be stated where appropriate to system performance.
- 3.2.4 Interaction concept with the driver when ODD limits are reached shall be explained including an overview of types of situations in which the system will generate a transition demand to the driver.
- 3.3. System layout and schematics
- 3.3.1. Inventory of components.
- A list shall be provided, collating all the units of “The System” and mentioning the other vehicle systems which are needed to achieve the control function in question.
- An outline schematic showing these units in combination, shall be provided with both the equipment distribution and the interconnections made clear.
- This outline shall include:
- Perception and objects detection including mapping and positioning
 - Characterization of Decision-making
 - Remote supervision and remote monitoring by a remote supervision (if applicable).
 - Perception and objects detection including mapping and positioning
- 3.3.2. Functions of the units
- The function of each unit of “The System” shall be outlined and the signals linking it with other units or with other vehicle systems shall be shown. This may be provided by a labelled block diagram or other schematic, or by a description aided by such a diagram.
- 3.3.3. Interconnections within “The System” shall be shown by a circuit diagram for the electric transmission links, by a piping diagram for pneumatic or hydraulic transmission equipment and by a simplified diagrammatic layout for

mechanical linkages. The transmission links both to and from other systems shall also be shown.

3.3.4. There shall be a clear correspondence between transmission links and the signals carried between Units. Priorities of signals on multiplexed data paths shall be stated wherever priority may be an issue affecting performance or safety.”

3.3.5. Identification of units

Each unit shall be clearly and unambiguously identifiable (e.g. by marking for hardware, and by marking or software output for software content) to provide corresponding hardware and documentation association.

Where functions are combined within a single unit or indeed within a single computer, but shown in multiple blocks in the block diagram for clarity and ease of explanation, only a single hardware identification marking shall be used. The manufacturer shall, by the use of this identification, affirm that the equipment supplied conforms to the corresponding document.

3.3.5.1. The identification defines the hardware and software version and, where the latter changes such as to alter the function of the Unit as far as this Regulation is concerned, this identification shall also be changed.

3.4. Safety concept of the manufacturer

3.4.1. The Manufacturer shall provide a statement which affirms that the “The System” is free from unreasonable risks for the driver, passengers and other road users.

3.4.2. In respect of software employed in “The System”, the outline architecture shall be explained and the design methods and tools used shall be identified (see 3.5.1). The manufacturer shall show evidence of the means by which they determined the realization of the system logic, during the design and development process.

3.4.3. The Manufacturer shall provide the Type Approval Authority with an explanation of the design provisions built into “The System” so as to ensure functional and operational safety. Possible design provisions in “The System” are for example:

- (a) Fall-back to operation using a partial system.
- (b) Redundancy with a separate system.
- (c) Removal of the automated driving function(s).

fault 3.4.3.1. If the chosen provision selects a partial performance mode of operation under certain fault conditions, then these conditions shall be stated and the resulting limits of effectiveness defined.

3.4.3.2. If the chosen provision selects a second (back-up) means to realise the performance of the dynamic driving tasks, the principles of the change-over mechanism, the logic and level of redundancy and any built in back-up checking features shall be explained and the resulting limits of back-up effectiveness defined.

3.4.3.3. If the chosen provision selects the removal of the Higher Level Function, this shall be done in compliance with the relevant provisions of this regulation (e.g. on minimum risk manoeuvre and transition demand). All the corresponding

output control signals associated with this function shall be inhibited, and in such a manner as to limit the transition disturbance.

- 3.4.4. The documentation shall be supported, by an analysis which shows, in overall terms, how the system will behave to mitigate or avoid hazards which can have a bearing on the safety of the driver, passengers and other road users.

The chosen analytical approach(es) shall be established and maintained by the Manufacturer and shall be made open for inspection by the Type-approval authority at the time of the type approval.

The Type-approval authority shall perform an assessment of the application of the analytical approach(es):

- (a) Inspection of the safety approach at the concept (vehicle) level.

This approach shall be based on a Hazard / Risk analysis appropriate to system safety.

- (b) Inspection of the safety approach at the system level including a top down (from possible hazard to design) and bottom up approach (from design to possible hazards). The safety approach may be based on a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and a system-theoretic process analysis (STPA) or any similar process appropriate to system functional and operational safety.
- (c) Inspection of the validation/verification plans and results including appropriate acceptance criteria. This shall include validation testing appropriate for validation, for example, Hardware in the Loop (HIL) testing, vehicle on-road operational testing, or any other testing appropriate for validation/verification.

The inspection shall confirm that each of the following items is covered where applicable under (a)-(c):

- (i) Interactions with other vehicle systems (e.g. braking, steering);
- (ii) Failures of the automated driving system and system risk mitigation reactions;
- (iii) Situations within the ODD when a system may create unreasonable safety risks for the driver, passengers and other road users due to operational disturbances (e.g. lack of or wrong comprehension of the vehicle environment, inadequate control, challenging scenarios)
- (iv) Identification of the relevant scenarios within the ODD and management method used to select scenarios and validation tool chosen
- (v) Decision making resulting in performance of the dynamic driving tasks (including e.g. emergency manoeuvres) and interaction with other road users and in compliance with traffic rules
- (vi) Reasonably foreseeable misuse by the driver (including e.g. driver availability recognition system and an explanation on how the availability criteria were established) and intentional tampering of the system.
- (viii) Cyber-attacks having an impact on the safety of the vehicle (can be done through the analysis done under the cyber regulation).

The assessment by the approval authority shall consist of spot checks of selected hazards (or cyber threats) to establish that argumentation supporting the safety concept is understandable and logical and implemented in the different functions of the systems. The assessment shall also check that validation plans are robust enough to demonstrate safety and have been completed.

It shall demonstrate that the vehicle is free from unreasonable risks for the driver; vehicle occupants and other road users in the operational design domain:

- The safety demonstration shall include a quantitative pre-validation target (e.g., using validation acceptance criteria), documented by the manufacturer, demonstrating that the introduction of the ADS will overall not increase the level of risk for the driver, passengers and other road users compared to a manually driven vehicles; and

- A qualitative approach showing that the overall level of risks has been minimized during development to a acceptable level for the driver, vehicle occupants and other road users.

The Type Approval Authority shall perform or shall require performing tests as specified in paragraph 4. to verify the safety concept.

- 3.4.4.1. This documentation shall itemize the parameters being monitored and shall set out, for each failure condition of the type defined in paragraph 3.4.4. of this annex, the warning signal to be given to the driver/passengers/other road users and/or to service/technical inspection personnel.
- 3.4.4.2. This documentation shall also describe the measures in place to ensure the “The System” is free from unreasonable risks for the driver, passengers and other road users when the performance of “The System” is affected by environmental conditions e.g. climatic, temperature, dust ingress, water ingress, ice packing.
- 3.5. Safety management system (Process Audit)
 - 3.5.1 In respect of software and hardware employed in “The System”, the manufacturer shall demonstrate to the type approval authority in terms of a safety management system that effective processes/methodologies/tools are in place, up to date and being followed within the organization to manage the safety and continued compliance throughout the product lifecycle (design, development, production, operation including respect of traffic rules, decommissioning).
 - 3.5.2. The design/development process shall be established including safety management system, requirements management, requirements’ implementation, testing, failure tracking, remedy and release
 - 3.5.3. The manufacturer shall institute and maintain effective communication channels between functional/operational safety, cybersecurity and any other relevant disciplines related to the achievement of vehicle safety.
 - 3.5.4. The manufacturer shall have processes to monitor safety-relevant incident/accidents caused by the engaged automated driving systems and a process to manage potential safety-relevant gaps post-registration (closed loop of field monitoring). They shall [have a process to] report critical incidents (e.g. collision with another road users) to the type-approval authorities when they occur.

- 3.5.5. The manufacturer shall demonstrate that periodic independent internal process audits are carried out to ensure that the processes established in accordance with paragraphs 3.5.1 to 3.5.4. are implemented consistently
- 3.5.6. Manufacturers shall put in place suitable arrangements (e.g. contractual arrangements, clear interfaces, quality management system) with suppliers to ensure that the supplier safety management system comply with the requirements of paragraph 3.5.1. to 3.5.5.
4. Verification and tests
- 4.1. The functional operation of “The System”, as laid out in the documents required in paragraph 3., shall be tested as follows:
- 4.1.1. Verification of the function of “The System”
- The Type approval authority shall verify “The System” under non-failure conditions by testing on a track a number of selected functions from those described by the manufacturer in paragraph 3.2. above, and by checking the overall behaviour of the system in real driving conditions including the compliance with traffic rules.
- These tests shall include scenarios whereby the system is overridden.
- 4.1.1.1. The verification results shall correspond with the description, including the control strategies, provided by the manufacturer in paragraph 3.2. and shall comply with the requirements of this regulation.
- 4.1.2. Verification of the safety concept of paragraph 3.4.
- The reaction of “The System” shall be checked under the influence of a faults in any individual unit by applying corresponding output signals to electrical units or mechanical elements in order to simulate the effects of internal failure within the unit. The Type approval authority shall conduct this check for at least one individual unit, but shall not check the reaction of “The System” to multiple simultaneous failures of individual units.
- The Type Approval Authority shall verify that these tests include aspects that may have an impact on vehicle controllability and user information (HMI aspects e.g. transition scenarios).
- 4.1.2.1 The Type Approval Authorities shall also check a number of scenarios that are critical for the object event detection and characterization of the decision-making and HMI functions of the system within the ODD concerned (e.g. object difficult to detect or when the system reaches the boundaries) as defined in the regulation.
- 4.1.2.2. The verification results shall correspond with the documented summary of the hazard analysis, to a level of overall effect such that the safety concept and execution are confirmed as being adequate and in compliance with the requirements of this regulation.
- 4.2. Simulation tool and mathematical models for verification of the safety concept may be used in accordance with Schedule 8 of Revision 3 of the 1958 Agreement, in particular for scenarios that are difficult on a test track or in real driving conditions. Manufacturers shall demonstrate the scope of the simulation tool, its validity for the scenario concerned as well as the validation performed for the simulation tool chain (correlation of the outcome with physical tests).

5. Reporting

Reporting of the assessment shall be performed in such a manner that allows traceability, e.g. versions of documents inspected are coded and listed in the records of the Technical Service.

An example of a possible layout for the assessment form from the Technical Service to the Type Approval Authority is given in Appendix 1 to this Annex.

6. Communication to the other Type Approval Authorities (See Appendix 3) - it could also be annexed to the Communication form)

- Description of the ODD and the high level functional architecture focusing on the functions available to the driver, passengers and other road users.

- Test results during the verification process by the type approval authorities.

7. Competence of the auditors/assessors

The assessments under this Annex may only be conducted by auditors/assessors with the technical and administrative knowledge necessary for such purposes. They shall in particular be qualified as auditor/assessor for functional and operational safety for ISO 26262-2018: on functional safety for road vehicles, and ISO PAS ISO/PAS 21448: Safety of the Intended Functionality of road vehicles; and being able to make the link with cybersecurity (ISO/SAE [DIS] 21434).

Annex 4 – Appendix 1

Traffic critical scenarios for ALKS

1. Traffic critical scenarios

The following three are traffic critical scenarios:

- Cut-in: the ‘other vehicle’ merges in front of the ‘ego vehicle’
- Cut-out: the ‘other vehicle’ exits the lane of the ‘ego vehicle’
- Deceleration: the ‘other vehicle’ decelerates in front of the ‘ego vehicle’

Each of these traffic critical scenarios can be created using the following parameters/elements:


- Road geometry
- Ego vehicle’s behavior/ manoeuvre
- Other vehicle’s behavior/ manoeuvre

2. Performance model of ALKS

Traffic critical scenarios of ALKS are divided into preventable and unpreventable scenarios. They are determined based on the performance model of the ALKS shown below;

- Human driver with ADAS model

In low-speed ALKS scenario, the avoidance capability required for the driver model is braking control only. As a result, this driver model is separated into the following three segments: “Risk perceive situation”; “Delay in time”; and, “Deceleration degree and Max. G-force”. Following is a visual representation of these segments:



Note: [a] depend on each scenario


[*/ = 0.75sec is a common data in Japan.

**/ = 0.6sec and 0.774G are a data from experiments of NHTSA and Japan. (Coefficient of road friction is 0.6.)

***/ = Timing of other vehicles start moving from lane keep to cut-in (or cut-out). It is indicated by lateral movement distance.

2.1. Driver model for the three ALKS scenarios:

2.1.1. For Cut in scenario:



The lateral wandering distance the vehicle will normally wander within the lane is [0.375m].
The perceived boundary for cut-in occurs when the vehicle exceeds the normal lateral wandering distance (prior to lane change)

[a] is perception distance. It defines the distance required to perceive that a vehicle is executing a cut-in manoeuvre [a] is obtained from the following formula;

$$[a:0.72m] = (\text{Max lateral movement speed: } 1.8\text{m/s}) \times (\text{Risk perception time: } 0.4\text{sec})$$


Max lateral movement speed is real world data in Japan.

Risk perception time is driving simulator data in Japan.

[2sec*] is specified as the maximum Time To Collision (TTC) for which we conclude that there is a danger in the longitudinal direction.

[*/=TTC 2.0sec is based on the UNR guidelines on warning signals.]

2.1.2. For Cut out scenario:




The lateral movement distance of leading vehicle when it starts lateral movement is [0.375m].
This parameter is skilled human driver that assumes a critical situation when leading vehicle moves [0.375m].

[a:0.4sec] is perception time (= delay in risk evaluation). Risk perceived position of side vehicle is determined by lateral movement speed of it.

[2sec**] is specified as the maximum Time Head Way (THW) for which we conclude that there is a danger in longitudinal direction.

[**/=THW 2.0sec is according to other countries' regulations and guidelines.]

2.1.3. For Deceleration scenario:



The delay in perception (= Risk evaluation delay time) is [a:0.4sec]. Risk perceived timing of leading vehicle is determined by deceleration rate of it.


2.2. Parameters


Parameters below are essential when describing the pattern of the traffic critical scenarios in paragraph 2.1.

Additional parameters could be added according to the ODD/OD (e.g. friction rate of the road).

Initial condition	Initial velocity	Ve0 = Ego vehicle
		Vo0 = Leading vehicle in lane or in adjacent lane
		Vf0 = Vehicle in front of leading vehicle in lane
Initial distance		dx0 = Distance in Longitudinal direction between ego and leading vehicle in lane or in adjacent lane
		dy0 = Inside Lateral distance between outside edge line of ego vehicle in parallel to the vehicle's median longitudinal plane within lanes and outside edge line of another vehicle in parallel to the vehicle's median longitudinal plane in adjacent lines.
		dx0_f = Distance in longitudinal direction between front end of leading vehicle and rear end of vehicle in front of leading vehicle
Vehicle motion	Lateral motion	Vy = Lateral velocity
	Deceleration	Gx_max = Maximum deceleration G dG/dt = Deceleration rate (Jerk)

Following are visual representations of parameters for the three types of scenarios






2.3. Data sheet

In addition to the above-mentioned driver models, following data sheets are available for checking within each scenario if the ADS would avoid a collision, taking into account any combination of each parameter within the vehicle speed that ALKS is able to function.


2.3.1. Cut in

(Data sheets image)







Initial condition	Initial velocity	[Ve0]	Ego vehicle velocity
		[Ve0-Vo0]	Relative velocity
	Initial distance	[dy0]	Lateral distance [※]
		[dx0]	Longitudinal distance
Vehicle motion	Lateral motion	[Vy]	Lateral velocity

※Lateral distance
 ex) Lane width : 3.5[m]
 Vehicle width:1.9[m]
 Driving in the center of the lane
 dy=1.6[m]





Ve0 : 60[kph]







Ve0 : 50[kph]





7 Ego vehicle velocity **[Ve0]** : 50[kph]
Relative velocity **[Ve0-Vo0]** : 30[kph]




8 Ego vehicle velocity **[Ve0]** : 50[kph]
Relative velocity **[Ve0-Vo0]** : 40[kph]





Ve0 : 40[kph]




11 Ego vehicle velocity **[Ve0]** : 40[kph]
Relative velocity **[Ve0-Vo0]** : 30[kph]



Ve0 : 30[kph]




Ve0 : 20[kph]



2.3.2 Cut out



It is possible to avoid all the deceleration (stop) vehicles ahead of the preceding vehicle cut-out in the following running condition at THW 2.0 sec.


(Data sheets image)





Initial condition	Initial velocity	[Ve0]	Ego vehicle velocity
		[Vo0]	Leading vehicle velocity
		[Vf0]	Vehicle in front of leading vehicle
	Initial distance	[dx0]	Longitudinal distance [※]
		[dx0_f]	Front of lead distance
Vehicle motion	Lateral motion	[Vy]	Lateral velocity

※ Follow the leading vehicle in THW=2sec
 Vo0 = Ve0(Same speed as the leading vehicle)
 Vf0 = 0 (stop vehicle)








2.3.3. Deceleration


It is possible to avoid sudden deceleration of -1.0G or less in the follow-up driving situation at THW 2.0sec.

(Data sheet image)



Initial condition	Initial velocity	[Ve0]	Ego vehicle velocity
		[Vo0]	Leading vehicle velocity
Vehicle motion	Initial distance	[dx0]	Longitudinal distance ^{※1}
	Deceleration	[Gx_max]	Maximum deceleration G
		[dG/dt]	Deceleration rate ^{※2}

- ※1 Follow the leading vehicle in THW=2sec
Vo0 = Ve0(Same speed as the leading vehicle)
- ※2 The most severe conditions[∞]



Annex 5

Test Specifications for ALKS

1. Introduction

This annex defines tests with the purpose to verify the technical requirements on ALKS.

Until such time that specific test provisions have been agreed, the Technical Service shall ensure that the ALKS is subject to at least the tests outlined in Annex 5. The specific test parameters for each test shall be selected by the Technical Service and shall be recorded in the test report in such a manner that allows traceability and repeatability of the test setup.

Pass- and Fail-Criteria for tests are derived solely from the technical requirements in paragraphs 5 to 7 of the Regulation. These requirements are worded in a way that they allow the derivation of pass-fail-criteria not only for a given set of test parameters, but for any combination of parameters in which the system is designed to work (e.g. operating speed range, operating lateral acceleration range, curvature range as contained in the system boundaries).

The test specifications in this document are meant to be a minimum set of tests, the technical service authorities may perform any other test within the system boundaries and may then compare the measured results against the requirements (concrete: expected test outcome).

2. Definitions

For the purposes of this Annex,

- 2.1. “*Time to Collision*” (TTC) means the value of time obtained by dividing the longitudinal distance (in the direction of travel of the subject vehicle) between the subject vehicle and the target by the longitudinal relative speed of the subject vehicle and the target, at any instant in time
- 2.2. “*Offset*” means the distance between the vehicle’s and the respective target’s longitudinal median plane in driving direction, measured on the ground, normalized by the half the vehicle width excluding devices for indirect vision and corrected by adding 50 %.
- 2.3. “*Pedestrian Target*” means a soft target that represents a pedestrian.
- 2.4. “*Vehicle Target*” means a target that represents a vehicle (passenger car).
- 2.5. “*Powered Two-Wheeler Target*” means a combination of a motorcycle and motorcyclist, a test device according to ISO [CD] 19206-5. The reference point for the location of the motorcycle shall be the most backward point on the centreline of the motorcycle

3. General Principles

- 3.1. Test conditions
 - 3.1.1. The tests shall be performed under conditions (e.g. environmental, road geometry) that allow the activation of the ALKS.
 - 3.1.2. If system modifications are required in order to allow testing, e.g. road type assessment criteria or road type information (map data), it shall be ensured that these modifications don’t have an effect on the test results. These modifications shall in principle be documented and annexed to the test report.

The description and the evidence of influence (if any) of these modifications shall be documented and annexed to the test report.

3.1.3. The test surface shall afford at least the adhesion required by the scenario in order to achieve the expected test result.

3.1.4. Test Targets

3.1.4.1. The target used for the vehicle detection tests shall be a regular high volume series production vehicle of Category M or N or alternatively a [3-D] “soft target” representative of a vehicle in terms of its identification characteristics applicable to the sensor system of the ALKS under test according to ISO 19206-3:2018. The reference point for the location of the vehicle shall be the most rearward point on the centreline of the vehicle.

3.1.4.2. The target used for the Powered-Two-wheeler tests shall be a combination of a motorcycle and motorcyclist, a test device according to ISO [CD] 19206-5:20[xx] or a series production two-wheeled motorcycle of Category L3. The reference point for the location of the motorcycle shall be the most backward point on the centreline of the motorcycle

3.1.4.3. The target used for the pedestrian detection tests shall be an adult “articulated soft target” and be representative of the human attributes applicable to the sensor system of the AEBS under test according to ISO 19206-2:2018.

3.1.4.4. Details that enable the target(s) to be specifically identified and reproduced shall be recorded in the vehicle type approval documentation.

3.2. Test parameter variation

The manufacturer shall declare the system boundaries to the Technical Service. The Technical Service shall define different combinations of test parameters (e.g. present speed of the ALKS vehicle, type and offset of target, curvature of lane) which cover the following conditions for each test scenario as specified in the Appendix of this Annex.

- A collision is avoided by regular manoeuvre,
- A collision is avoided by emergency manoeuvre,
- A collision cannot be avoided but emergency manoeuvre is executed.

If this is deemed justified, the Technical Service may test additionally any other combination of parameters.

If a collision cannot be avoided for some test parameters, the manufacturer shall demonstrate either by documentation or, if possible, by verification/testing that the system doesn't unreasonably switch its control strategy.

4. Test scenarios to assess the performance of the system with regard to the dynamic driving task

4.1. Lane Keeping

4.1.1. The test shall demonstrate that the ALKS does not leave its lane and maintains a stable position inside its ego lane across the speed range and different curvatures within its system boundaries.¹

4.1.2. The test shall be executed at least:

- With a minimum test duration of 5 minutes.

4.2. Avoid a collision with a road user or object blocking the lane

¹ Add a criteria that vehicle is stable in the lane if another vehicle beside is very close to the lane marking.

- 4.2.1. The test shall demonstrate that the ALKS avoids a collision with a stationary vehicle, road user or fully or partially blocked lane up to the maximum specified speed of the system.
- 4.2.2. This test shall be executed at least
- With a stationary vehicle target
 - With a stationary powered two-wheeler target
 - With a stationary adult pedestrian target
 - With an adult pedestrian target crossing the lane with a speed of 5 km/h
 - With a target representing a blocked lane
 - With multiple consecutive obstacles blocking the lane (e.g. in the following order: ego-vehicle -motorcycle - car)
 - On a curved section of road
- 4.3. Following a lead vehicle
- 4.3.1. The test shall demonstrate that the ALKS is able to maintain and restore the required safety distance to a vehicle in front and is able to avoid a collision with a lead vehicle which decelerates up to its maximum deceleration.
- 4.3.2. This test shall be executed at least:
- Across the entire speed range of the ALKS
 - For constant and varying lead vehicle velocities (e.g. following a realistic speed profile from existing driving database)
 - For straight and curved sections of road
 - With a deceleration of the lead vehicle of at least 6m/s^2 mean fully developed deceleration until standstill.
- 4.4. Lane change of another vehicle into lane
- 4.4.1. The test shall demonstrate that the ALKS is capable of avoiding a collision with a vehicle cutting into the lane of the ALKS vehicle up to a certain criticality of the cut-in manoeuvre.
- 4.4.2. The criticality of the cut-in manoeuvre shall be determined according to TTC, longitudinal distance between rear-most point of the cutting in vehicle and front-most point of the ALKS vehicle, the lateral velocity of the cutting-in vehicle and the longitudinal movement of the cutting-in vehicle, as defined in paragraph 5.2.5. of this Regulation.
- 4.4.3. This test shall be executed taking into consideration at least the following conditions:
- For different TTC, distance and relative velocity values of the cut-in manoeuvre
 - For cutting-in vehicles travelling at constant longitudinal speed, accelerating and decelerating
 - For different lateral velocities, lateral accelerations of the cut-in vehicle
- 4.5. Stationary obstacle after lane change of the lead vehicle
- 4.5.1. The test shall demonstrate that the ALKS is capable of avoiding a collision with a stationary vehicle, road user or blocked lane that becomes visible after a preceding vehicle avoided a collision by an evasive manoeuvre.
- 4.5.2. The test shall be executed at least:
- With a stationary vehicle target centred in lane
 - With a powered two-wheeler target centred in lane
 - With a stationary adult pedestrian target centred in lane

- With a target representing a blocked lane centred in lane

5. Additional verification

- 5.1. The Technical Service shall assess the detection areas of the ALKS to the side and to the front according to paragraphs 7.1.2. and 7.1.1. of this Regulation.
- 5.2. Compliance with the following provisions shall be demonstrated by the manufacturer and assessed by the Technical Service at the time of type approval:

Test/Check

- 6.2.2. Off mode after new engine start/run
- 6.2.3 System can only be activated if
- The driver is in driver seat & belt is fastened
 - The driver is available
 - No failures
 - DSSAD operational
 - Conditions are within system limits
- 6.2.1 Means of deactivating
- 6.2.4 Dedicated means to activate and deactivate
- 6.2.5 protected against unintentional action
- 6.2.6 Steering
- Holding wheel and brake/accelerate
- Driver holds steering wheel in response to transition and MRM
- After deactivation
- 6.3 Means to override the system
- Steering control
- Braking input higher than system
- Accelerating to speed within system limits
- 6.1.3.1. Criteria for deeming driver available
- 5.1.3 Driver support systems active
- 6.3.1.1. Driver attentiveness
- 5.5 System behaviour during a Minimal Risk Manoeuvre
- Driver take over
- Standstill (harzard lights)
- Re-activation disabled if reached standstill
- 5.1.4 Transition demand & behaviour/escalation
- 5.1.5 Driver resumes control
- 5.4 Without driver response (MRM)
- Planned transition
- Unplanned transition

<i>Test/Check</i>	
6.1.2	Transition demand during operation
6.1.3	Exceed system parameters
5.4.	Failure
	Detectable collision
	Driver not present
5.3	System behaviour for Emergency Manoeuvre
	Resulting in standstill
	Not resulting in standstill
7.1	System detection areas
7.1.1	Front
7.1.2	Sides
7.1.3	Visibility
5.3.	Additional other test cases may be assessed if it is deemed justified by the Technical Service. Some of the cases may include:
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Y-split of highway lanes - Vehicles entering or exiting the highway - Partially blocked ego lane, tunnel - Traffic lights - Emergency vehicles - Construction zones - Faded/erased/hidden lane markings - Emergency/Service personnel directing traffic - Change in road characteristics (no longer divided, pedestrians permitted, roundabout, intersection) - Normal traffic flow resumed (i.e. all vehicles moving > 60km/h)
5.4.	Real-world test
	<p>The Technical Service shall conduct, or shall witness, an assessment of the system, in a fault-free condition, in the presence of traffic (a 'real-world' test). The purpose of this test is to support the Technical Service in understanding the functionality of the system in its operating environment and to complement the assessment of the documentation provided under Annex 4.</p> <p>Together, the assessment of Annex 4 and the real-world test shall enable the Technical Service to identify areas of system performance that may require further assessment, either through testing or further review of Annex 4.</p> <p>During the real-world assessment, the Technical Service shall assess at least:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Prevention of activation when the system is outside of its technical boundaries/requirements for ALKS 2) No violation of traffic rules 3) Response to a planned event 4) Response to an unplanned event

- 5) Detection of the presence of other road users within the frontal and lateral detection ranges
- 6) Vehicle behaviour in response to other road users (following distance, cut-in scenario, cut-out scenario etc).
- 7) System override

The location and selection of the test route, time-of-day and environmental conditions shall be determined by the Technical Service.

The test drive shall be recorded and the test vehicle instrumented with non-perturbing equipment. The Technical Service may log, or request logs of any data channels used or generated by the system as deemed necessary for post-test evaluation.

It is recommended that the real-world test is undertaken once the system has passed all of the other tests outlined in this Annex and upon completion of a risk assessment by the Technical Service.

Annex 5 - Appendix

Para	Description	No Object	Passenger Car			Powered Two Wheeler			Pedestrian			Obstacle		
		RM	RM	EM	NAS	RM	EM	NAS	RM	EM	NAS	RM	EM	NAS
4.1	Lane Keeping													
	Lane Keeping and stability	X												
	Parallel vehicle drifting towards ego vehicle		X			X								
4.2	Avoid a collision with a road user or object blocking the lane													
	Stationary vehicle					X								
	Stationary adult pedestrian								X					
	Adult pedestrian crossing the lane								X	[X]				
	Object representing a blocked lane											X		
	Object partially blocking the lane											X		
	Multiple obstacles in the lane					X								
4.3	Following a lead vehicle													
	Following Distance Test		X	X		[X]	[X]							
	[Following Stability Test (lateral offset)]		X			[X]								
4.4	Lane Change of another vehicle into the lane													
	Cut in Tests with an accelerating cut in vehicle		X			[X]								
	Cut in Tests with a constant speed cut in vehicle		X	X		[X]	[X]							
	Cut in Tests with a decelerating cut in vehicle		X	X	X	[X]	[X]							
4.5	Stationary obstacle after lane change of the lead vehicle													
	Cut out Tests		X	X		X	X		X	X		X	X	
4.6.	Field of view													
	[Dynamic Field of View Tests (Forward)]					[X]			[X]					
	[Dynamic Field of View Test (Lateral)]					[X]								

Note:

RM	Regular Manoeuvre.
EM	Emergency Manoeuvre.
NAS	Non-Avoidable Situation.

	Potential test area that can be selected by the technical service in addition to the mandatory testing. Note pass/fail criteria for NAS tests does not apply, mitigation strategy will be assessed by the technical service.
X	Mandatory test area to be tested by the technical service. Each 'X' indicates that a mandatory single test is to be carried out. Additional testing may be carried out in this area at the request of the technical service with varied parameters compared to the testing already performed.
X	Mandatory test area to be tested by the technical service. Each 'X' indicates that a mandatory single test is to be carried out. Additional testing may be carried out in this area at the request of the technical service with varied parameters compared to the testing already performed. Pass/fail criteria detailed within this regulation does not apply. However, the ALKS mitigation strategy will be assessed by the technical service.
